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Network economics is a fast growing area of study, with a lot of potential for addressing
a wide variety of socio-economic phenomena. Networks literally permeate our social
and economic lives. The unemployed nd jobs using the information and assistance of
their friends and relatives. Consumers benet from the research of friends and family
into new products. In medicine and other technical elds, professional networks shape
research patterns. In all these settings, the well-being of participants depends on social,
geographic, or trading relationships. The countless ways in which network structures
aect our well-being make it critical to understand: (i) how network structures impact
behavior, (ii) what can be done, in the way of design by policymakers, to improve
systemic outcomes. This area of study, broadly called network economics, is at the
heart of my research interests.
In my dissertation I focus on three specic applications of network theory. The rst appli-
cation concerns networks in trade, where network structure represents the organization
of trade agreements between countries. The second application deals with networks in
nancial market, and the network is used to model the structure of interbank exposures.
Lastly, for the third application, I consider networks in labor markets and migration.
In this context, the network represents the structure of social relations between people.
Each of these applications of network analysis is addressed by one of three chapters in
the thesis.
The rst chapter is devoted to studying the impact of the structure of the trade network
and the eects of expansion of this network, in a process of trade liberalization, on R&D
decisions and on the subsequent productivity levels of rms. Recent empirical evidence
has shown that, in general, trade liberalization promotes innovation and productivity
growth in individual rms. In my work, I assert that dierent types of trade liberaliza-
tion { multilateral versus regional { may lead to dierent R&D and productivity levels
of rms. The network of trade agreements is modelled by a set of nodes, representing
countries, and a set of links, indicating trade agreements between the linked countries.
In this framework, the multilateral trade agreement is represented by the complete net-
work, while the overlap of regional trade agreements is represented by the hub-and-spoke
trade system. Trade liberalization, which increases the network of trade agreements, re-
inforces the incentives for rms to invest in R&D through the creation of new markets
(scale eect) but it may also dampen these incentives through the emergence of new
competitors (competition eect). The joint action of these two eects within the multi-
lateral and the regional trade systems gives rise to the result that, for the same number
of direct trade partners, the R&D eort of a country in the multilateral agreement is
lower than the R&D eort of a hub but higher than the R&D eort of a spoke. This
ii
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DOI: 10.2870/13994suggests that productivity gains of regionalism versus those of multilateralism depend
heavily on the relative number of regional trade agreements signed by countries. If a
country signs relatively large number of trade agreements within the regional system
(core country), then its R&D and productivity are higher than R&D and productivity
of a country in the multilateral system. At the same time, a country that signs a rela-
tively small number of trade agreements within the regional system (periphery country)
has lower productivity gains than a country in the multilateral system. Additionally, I
nd that the aggregate level of R&D activities within the multilateral trade agreement
exceeds that in the star, the simplest representative of the hub-and-spoke trade system.
In the second chapter, I consider the network of lending and borrowing relationships
between banks and study the impact of the structure of this network on systemic risk and
the scale of systemic breakdown in the interbank market. I focus on the risk and potential
impact of system-wide defaults in the frequently observed "tiered" banking system,
where rst-tier institutions, that are relatively few in number, are connected with second-
tier "peripheral" banks and are also connected with each other, while the peripheral
banks are almost exclusively connected with the rst-tier banks. The banking network
is constructed from a number of banks which are linked by interbank exposures with
a certain predened probability. In this framework, the tiered structure is represented
either by a network with negative correlation in connectivity of neighboring banks, or
alternatively, by a network with a scale-free distribution of connectivity across banks.
The main nding of this chapter highlights the advantages of tiering within the banking
system, in terms of both the resilience of the banking network to systemic shocks and
the extent of necessary government intervention should a crisis evolve. Specically, the
tiered network structure, showing negative correlations in bank connectivity, is found to
be less prone to systemic breakdown than other structures. Moreover, in the scale-free
tiered system, the resilience of the system to shocks increases as the level of tiering
grows. Also, the targeted government bail-out policy aimed at rescuing the most highly
connected failing banks in the rst place, is expected to be more eective and induce
lower costs in a tiered system with high level of tiering.
Finally, in the third chapter, I examine the puzzling case of 19th century Italian migra-
tion to the New World, when migrants from the north and the south of Italy revealed
dierent preferences in their location choice and willingness to migrate. I study the ori-
gins of these regional variations focusing on the potential impact of social links between
people on their migration decisions. Specically, I examine whether the initial small
dierence in the number of social connections of the Northern and Southern Italians
in North America could have resulted in the subsequently large dierence in the size
of migration ows. To address this issue, I develop a model in which there is a home
country and a destination country and agents in both countries share information about
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DOI: 10.2870/13994job opportunities through an explicitly modelled network of social relations. Agents in
the home country compare their employment opportunities at home and abroad and
take once-and-for-all migration decisions via strategic interaction in a game. I study the
eects of a social network on agents' equilibrium migration decisions and in particular,
the eects of a small change in the number of agents' contacts in the destination country
on the size of the migration ow. Using the results of analytical work and numerical
simulations, I nd that even a marginal increase in the number of links between coun-
tries may lead to a substantial increase in migration. For example, in the specic case
when the network of social relations is complete and agents primarily care about their
long-run expected income, there exists a threshold value for the number of social links
to the destination country, such that no one migrates at the maximal equilibrium if the
actual number of these links is below the threshold but everyone migrates if the number
of these links is above the threshold. These results provide a support for the hypothesis
that initially small variation in the number of North American contacts of the Northern
and Southern Italians could have led to signicant discrepancy in regional emigration.
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In the era of unprecedented proliferation of regional trade agreements and simultaneous
developments in the WTO, assessments of the relative economic benets of multilat-
eralism versus regionalism take on special signicance. Numerous studies investigate
the dierence in welfare benets, trade volumes, GDP levels and GDP growth rates
across multilateral and regional trade arrangements.1 However, the existing literature
has not examined the issue of possible variations of the impact of dierent types of trade
liberalization on countries' productivity.
The latter is surprising for at least two reasons. First, productivity is a key determinant
of aggregate output, which is found to vary across dierent types of trade arrangements.
Secondly, recent empirical evidence has shown that, in general, trade liberalization has
a signicant eect on the productivity level of the country. Bustos (2007) nds that
during the period of trade liberalization between Argentina and Brazil, companies in
sectors beneting from a comparatively higher reduction in Brazil's taris increased
1For an extensive research of theoretical models on this subject see Panagariya (2000). The em-
pirical works are summarized in De la Torre and Kelly (1982), Srinivasan et al. (1993), and Frankel
(1997). Other theoretical and empirical works include Krueger (1999), Bhagwati (1993), Kowalczyk and
Wonnacott (1992), Deltas et al. (2005), Goyal and Joshi (2006), Diao et al. (2003).
1
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their spending on purchases of technology goods. Likewise, Treer (2004) observes that
the U. S. tari concessions caused a boost in labor productivity of the Canadian rms
in the most impacted, export-oriented group of industries. Similar patterns are shown
by Bernard et al. (2006) for the U. S., by Topolova (2004) for India, by Aw et al. (2000)
for Korea and Taiwan, by Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for Chile, and by Van Biesebroeck
(2005) for sub-Saharan Africa.2 Additionally, the positive eect of trade liberalization
on productivity is substantiated by extensive theoretical work.3
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the impact of trade liberal-
ization on rms' productivity by studying how this impact varies across two types of
trade liberalization { multilateral versus regional. I consider a model in which rms can
improve their productivity by investing in costly R&D. Here R&D is viewed broadly as
any activity aimed at reducing the marginal cost of production.4
I study the mechanisms through which trade can aect the return to innovation within
dierent types of trade systems. The two major mechanisms are the scale eect due to
the increased size of the market and the competition eect due to the increased number
of competitors in the markets. The focus of this paper is on the interaction of the two
eects within multilateral and regional types of trade agreements.
I model trade agreements between countries with a network. Nodes represent countries
and a link between the nodes indicates the existence of a trade agreement. In every
country, there is a single rm producing one good. The good is sold domestically and
in markets of the trade partner countries subject to oligopolistic competition. There
is, therefore, an intra-industry trade between countries which are directly linked in the
network.
The advantage of modelling trade agreements with a network is that it enables distinction
between various types of trade systems. In particular, it allows for concentration on
such dierences between trade systems as the degree of countries' trade involvement
(the number of trade agreements signed) and the nature of market interaction between
countries (which countries trade and compete with each other, in which markets, the
number of traders in each market, etc)who trades and competes with whom, on which
2The evidence on industry-level productivity improvements is presented in Baggs et al. (2002) for
Canada, in Pavcnik (2002) for Chile, in Muendler (2004) for Brazil, in Bernard et al. (2006) for the U.
S., and in Del Gatto et al. (2006) for Europe.
3The theoretical models identify several channels through which international trade aects productiv-
ity at the industry and/or at the rm level: the improved allocation of resources through specialization
(Grossman and Helpman (1991)), the knowledge spillovers eect (Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), De-
vereux and Lapham (1994)), the reallocation of economic activities from less to more productive rms
(Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2007), Yeaple (2005)), the exploitation of economies of scale (Krugman
(1980)), the pro-competitive eect of trade openness (Aghion et al. (2005), Peretto (2003), Licandro
and Navas-Ruiz (2007)), and others. See World Trade Report 2008 for the survey.
4Examples include developing new production technology, training of employees, internal re-
organization of resources and factors of production.
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markets, how many traders are present in each market, etc). Given the focus of this
paper on the interaction between the scale and competition eects of trade liberalization
within dierent types of trade systems, capturing exactly these dierences is key.
I constrain the analysis to two specic classes of network structures associated with the
multilateral and the regional scenarios of trade liberalization. The rst class of networks
are symmetric, or regular, networks. It incorporates the case of a complete network
structure { a network where any one country is directly linked to every other country.
The complete network in this model represents the multilateral trade agreement. The
second class of networks are asymmetric networks with two types of nodes: high and low
degree nodes. This class of networks captures the basic characteristics of the so-called
hub-and-spoke trade system, where some countries (hubs) have relatively large number of
direct trade partners as compared to other countries (spokes), which are mainly involved
in trade agreements with hubs. According to a number of contributions on regional trade
agreements, the hub-and-spoke trade arrangement has become a typical outcome of the
regional trade liberalization.5
The modelling approach in this paper is closely related to the common approach in the
strand of literature on R&D co-operation between rms in oligopoly. This strand of lit-
erature is well represented by the seminal papers, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and Goyal and Moraga (2002). They consider a framework of Cournot competition,
where at a pre-competitive stage rms can exert a cost-reducing eort. The typical ele-
ment of this approach is that the rationale of co-operation between rms is the existence
of R&D spillovers, which creates an externality. Co-operation is intended to internalize
such an externality.
Similarly to models with R&D co-operation, in this model rms compete in a Cournot
fashion choosing individual R&D eorts and production levels in a two-stage non-
cooperative game. However, in contrast to D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Goyal
and Moraga (2002) and the related literature, I abstract from R&D collaboration and
spillovers. Instead, I concentrate purely on the eects of market access and competition
faced by rms within various types of trade agreements on innovation intensity of the
rms. Furthermore, unlike the assumption of standard oligopolistic competition between
rms in one common market imposed in D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Goyal
and Moraga (2002), the central assumption in the present framework is that rms com-
pete not only in one, but in several separate markets and every market is accessible only
to those rms which have a trade agreement with that market. Clearly, this assumption
5The concept of hub-and-spoke trade arrangement was rst introduced in Lipsey (1990) and Won-
nacott (1990). It was further developed in Lipsey (1991), Wonnacott (1991, 1996), Kowalczyk and
Wonnacott (1991, 1992), Baldwin (2003, 2005), De Benedictis et al. (2005), and others.
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results in heterogeneity between rms in terms of their market size, a feature which is
absent from the previous models.
The primary result of the paper is that the impact of trade liberalization on rms' R&D
eorts depends crucially on the features of the trade agreements. Basically, the sizes
of the scale eect and the competition eect, due to a new trade partner, vary across
the multilateral and the regional trade systems since both eects are predetermined by
the structure of the trade system. For example, with regard to the scale eect, gaining
access to a new market in either a multilateral or bilateral context enhances incentives
for rms to innovate. Yet, the "net worth", or the eective size, of the new market
depends on the number of other rms present in the market and on the competitive
power of these rms { their R&D and production levels. Those are both determined by
the structure of the trade system. Similarly, with respect to the competition eect, a
new trade partner of a rm, both in the multilateral and regional agreements becomes an
additional rival of the rm in its domestic market. However, depending on the structure
of the trade system, it may also become a rival in some, all or none of the rm's foreign
markets. Furthermore, the size of the market share obtained by the new rival in rm's
domestic and foreign markets depends on the number and competitive strength of other
rms present in these markets, as well as the competitive strength of the rival himself.
Those characteristics are dened by the structure of the trade system and by the market
interactions of the rms with their own trade partners.
The dierence in the scale and competition eects of trade liberalization and the resulting
dierence in the eective sizes of markets across the multilateral and the regional trade
systems leads to the variation in levels of R&D eorts across systems. I show that for
the same number of direct trade partners, the R&D eort of a hub in the regional trade
system is higher than that of a country in the multilateral agreement. On the other
hand, the R&D eort of a spoke is lower than that of a hub and lower than the R&D
eort of a country in the multilateral agreement, even if a country in the multilateral
agreement has the same number of direct trade partners as a spoke.6 Additionally, I
nd that the aggregate R&D eort within the multilateral trade agreement exceeds that
in the star { the simplest representative of the hub-and-spoke trade system.7
Some other ndings of the paper concern the change in R&D investments by rms as
the network of trade agreements expands. First, consistent with the empirical evidence
discussed at the outset, I nd that, in both the multilateral and regional trade systems,
6The same relative eects are found for the welfare and the real income values of countries in the
stylized 3-country model by Deltas et al. (2005) and by Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992).
7Formally, the star network is a network in which there is a central country (hub) which is directly
linked to every other country (spoke), while none of the other countries have a direct link with each
other. The star in the present model is essentially a set of bilaterals of a hub with spokes, where each
spoke has a trade agreement only with the hub.
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an increase in the number of direct trade partners enhances innovation of a rm, at least
as soon as the number of other rms present in the new trade partner countries is not
"too large". Secondly, in the multilateral trade agreement, the rate of an increase in
rm's R&D eort is declining in the size of the agreement.8 I show that this result is
implied by the decreasing market-enhancement eect of the new trade partners.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model and describes the
two-stage game between rms. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 describe the solution of the second
and of the rst stage of the game, respectively. Section 1.5 discusses the scale and the
competition eects of trade liberalization on rms' innovation decisions. The joint ac-
tion of these two eects within the multilateral and the hub-and-spoke trade systems
is studied in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 of trade liberalization. The scenarios are com-
pared in Section 1.6 and their policy implications are discussed in Section 1.7. Finally,
Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The model
Network of regional trade agreements
Consider a setting with N countries where some countries are participants of one or more
trade agreements (TAs) within a certain industry. I model trade agreements between
countries with a network: countries are the nodes of the network and each link indicates
the existence of a trade agreement between the two linked countries. If two countries
have negotiated a TA, then each oers the other a privileged access to its domestic
market: the taris and restrictions on trade are reduced. Otherwise, for simplicity I
assume that taris and restrictions on trade between countries which did not sign a
TA are trade-prohibitive. So in fact, trade may only exist between countries which have
negotiated a TA, that is, only between countries which are directly linked in the network.
For any i 2 1 : N, I will denote by Ni the set of countries with which country i has a
trade link in the network of TAs. These are direct trade partners of i. Let jNij be the
cardinality of set Ni.9 Also, let N2
i be the set of direct trade partners of direct trade
partners of i, dierent from i. In other words, N2
i is the set of two-links-away trade
partners of i in the network of TAs. Notice that some countries may simultaneously be
direct and two-links-away trade partners of i. Let jN2
i j be the cardinality of set N2
i
This model takes the network of trade agreements as exogenously given. Besides, since
the trade agreement between any two countries are reciprocal, all links in the network
are undirected and no multiple links exist.
8This nding is consistent with the hump-shaped relationship between competition and innovation
derived by Aghion et al. (2005).
9This is the degree of i in the network.
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Demand and cost structure
In every country, there is a single rm producing one good. The rm in country i can sell
its good in the domestic market and in the markets of those countries with which i has
a trade agreement. Let the output of rm i (from country i) produced for consumption
in country j be denoted by yij. The total output of rm i is given by yi =
P
j2Ni[fig yij.
Each rm i exporting its good to country j 2 Ni [fig faces an inverse linear demand in
country j given by:








where a;b > 0 and
P
k2Nj[fjg ykj  a=b.
Let  denote the trade costs faced by every rm per unit of exports to any of its direct
trade partners. These costs include taris on unit of export, transportation costs, etc.10





In addition, each rm can invest in R&D. The R&D eort of the rm helps lower its
marginal cost of production. The cost of production of rm i is, therefore, a function
of its production, yi, and the amount of research, xi, that it undertakes. I assume that
the cost function of each rm is linear and is given by:
ci(yi;xi) = (   xi)yi (1.3)
where 0  xi   8i 2 1 : N. In the following, I will also assume that a is suciently
large as compared to  and the costs of trade between countries. Namely, let
Assumption 1 a > (1 + maxi21:N jNij) + 2
This assumption ensures that the demand for a good is high in all markets, so that in
equilibrium, all rms produce strictly positive amounts of both the physical and the
technological good. The R&D eort is costly: given the level xi 2 [0;] of eort, the
cost of eort of rm i is
zi(xi) = x2
i;  > 0 (1.4)
10The analysis carries over in a setting where  = 0. The assumption of zero trade costs is standard in
the literature on the formation of the network of TAs. See, for example, Furusawa and Konishi (2007),
Goyal and Joshi (2006), and Mauleon et al. (2006).
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Under this specication, the cost of the R&D eort is an increasing function and reects
the existence of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures.11 The parameter  measures
the curvature of this function. In the following, it is assumed that  is suciently large
so that the second order conditions hold and equilibria can be characterized in terms of
the rst-order conditions and are interior.12
Two-stage game
Firms' strategies consist of the level of R&D activities and a subsequent production
strategy based on their R&D choice. Both strategies are chosen via interaction in a
two-stage non-cooperative game. In the rst stage, each rm chooses a level of its
R&D eort. The R&D eort of a rm determines its marginal cost of production.
In the second stage, given these costs of production, rms operate in their domestic
market and in the markets of their trade partners by choosing production quantities
fyijgi21:N;j2Ni[fig for every market. Each rm chooses the prot-maximizing quantity
for each market separately, using the Cournot assumption that the other rms' outputs
are given.
Notice the specic nature of interaction between rms in this game. First, rms compete
with each other not in one but in several separate markets. Secondly, since countries
trade only with those countries with which they have a trade agreement (a direct link
in the network), a rm competes only with its direct and two-links-away trade partners.
Furthermore, any direct trade partner of rm i competes with i in its own market and
in the market of rm i, while any two-links-away trade partner of rm i, who is not
simultaneously its direct trade partner, competes with i only in the market(s) of their
common direct trade partner(s). This two-links-away radius of interaction between rms
does not mean however that R&D and production choices of rms are not aected by
other rms. As soon as the network of TAs is connected,13 rms that are further than
two links away from rm i aect R&D and production strategies of rm i indirectly,
through the impact which they have on R&D and production choices of their own trade
partners and trade partners of their partners, etc.
The game is solved for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, using backward induction.
Each stage of the game is considered in turn.
11An important justication of this assumption is that "the technological possibilities linking R&D
inputs and innovative outputs do not display any economies of scale with respect to the size of the rm
in which R&D is undertaken" (Dasgupta (1986), p. 523).
12The assumptions imposed on the parameters of the demand and cost functions are standard in the
models with linear-quadratic specication of the objective function (the rm's prot function in this
case). This is admittedly a special setting. Yet, even in this simple case, the analysis of the interaction
between markets and R&D eorts of rms in the network is quite complicated.
13The network is connected if there exists a path between any pair of nodes.
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1.3 Solving the second stage
In the second stage, each rm i 2 1 : N chooses a vector of its production plans
fyijgj2Ni[fig so as to maximize its prot, conditional on R&D eorts fxigi21:N. The






























Notice that function i is additively separable and quadratic in the output levels fyijgj2Ni[fig
of rm i. This leads to linear rst-order conditions and guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the solution of each rm's maximization problem.14 Simple algebra results
in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium production levels fyijgi2N;j2Ni[fig of every rm i for




















A; j 2 Ni (1.7)
So, the equilibrium output of rm i in country j 2 Ni [ fig is increasing in rm's own
R&D eort and it is decreasing in R&D eorts of i's rivals in market j. That is, the
higher the equilibrium R&D eort of i and the lower the equilibrium eort of every
k 2 Nj [ fjg, k 6= i, the higher the share of market j gained by i.
Additionally, notice that the presence of non-negative trade costs  gives any rm i the
competitive advantage over its rivals on the domestic market and implies at least as high
production of i for the domestic market as for the markets of its direct trade partners.
Indeed, as soon as xi = xj for some j 2 Ni, the equilibrium level of production for
14Since b > 0, the second order conditions hold.






























(a (+jNjj+2)) > 0 8k 2 1 : N 8j 2 Nk[fkg
Teteryatnikova, Mariya (2010), Essays on Applied Network Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13994Chapter 1. R&D in the Network of International Trade 9
market i of rm i is at least as high as that of rm j. Similarly, if for some j 2 Ni




k02Nj;k06=i xk0, the equilibrium level of production of
rm i for the domestic market is at least as high as its production for market j.
1.4 Solving the rst stage
At the rst stage, rms choose R&D eorts. Plugging expressions (1.6){ (1.7) for the
output levels fykjgk2Nj[fjg of Cournot competitors in country j into the prot func-
tion (1.5) of rm i, we obtain the function of the R&D eort levels fxkgk2Nj[fjg. After



















(jNjj + 2)2 +
























(jNjj + 2)2xixk + f(fxkgk2Ni[N2
i ) (1.8)
where f(fxkgk2Ni[N2
i ) is a function of R&D eorts of i's competitors in dierent markets



























The prot function (1.8) of rm i is quadratic in its own R&D eort xi. Besides, if
 is suciently high, so that the R&D cost function zi is suciently steep, the prot
function of rm i is concave in xi. To be more precise, for a given network of trade









(jNjj + 2)2 (1.9)
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the second order conditions hold and the prot maximizing R&D eorts of all rms can






























(jNjj + 2)2xk =
1
b








(a    + jNij)
jNij + 1
(jNij + 2)2 (1.10)
for all i 2 1 : N. In the matrix form, this system can be written as
  x = u (1.11)
where x2 RN is a vector of unknowns, u2 RN, and  is (N N) square matrix. As soon
as the network of trade agreements is connected, the matrix  is generically nonsingular
and the right-hand side vector u is non-zero. Then (1.11) has a unique generic solution
in RN, denoted by x. Below it is shown that if  satises an additional restriction,
stronger than condition (1.9), this solution is ensured to be such that for all i 2 1 : N,
0 < x
i  .
First, note that in the ith rst-order condition in (1.10), the value of the expression
on the right-hand side and the coecients multiplying all xk, k 2 Ni [ N2
i [ fig, are
positive. Therefore, the value of xi is larger the smaller the values of xj and xk for all
j 2 Ni and k 2 N2
i . Hence, the sucient condition for x
i > 0 is that (1.10) evaluated
at xj = xk =  8j 2 Ni, k 2 N2
i denes the value of xi, which is greater than zero. This
condition is provided by Assumption 1. Similarly, the sucient condition for x
i   is
that (1.10) evaluated at xj = xk = 0 8j 2 Ni, k 2 N2
i denes xi, which is smaller than
or equal to . This condition is equivalent to





















(jNjj+2)2 from the earlier restriction on  in (1.9). Therefore,
Assumption 2 is stronger. Together, Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that solution x
of a system of the rst-order conditions (1.10)(or (1.11)) is such that 0 < x
i   for
all i 2 1 : N, and the second order conditions hold. Moreover, if the inequality in
Assumption 2 is strict, solution x is interior.16
16Intuitively, when Assumption 1 holds, the demand for a good in each market is large, which stimu-
lates R&D investment (x

i > 0). On the other hand, by Assumption 2, the cost of R&D is high, which
connes the amount of R&D expenditures (x

i  ).
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The specication of the rst-order conditions (1.10) suggests that an increase in R&D
eorts of rm i's direct and/or two-links-away trade partners trigger a downward shift
in rm i's response. Intuitively, by exerting higher R&D eorts, rm i's rivals capture
larger shares of the markets and dampen the incentive of i to invest in R&D. We say
that the eorts of rm i and its direct and two-links-away trade partners are strategic
substitutes from i's perspective.













































The short proof of this statement is provided in Appendix B. It is easy to see that due
to Assumptions 1 and 2, equilibrium prot i of any rm i is strictly positive.
1.5 The impact of trade liberalization on equilibrium R&D
eorts
In the framework of the present model, trade liberalization can be dened as an expan-
sion of the network of trade agreements through an increase in the number of concluded
trade agreements (links or links and nodes).
First, consider an impact of trade liberalization on equilibrium R&D eorts of rms in
two countries which negotiate a trade agreement with each other. There are two major
mechanisms at work. On the one hand, a new trade agreement creates an additional
market for each rm (scale eect). This amplies the return to productivity-enhancing
investment, increasing the equilibrium R&D eort of each rm. On the other hand, the
new agreement opens the markets of both countries to a new competitor (competition
eect). This has two opposite eects on R&D. The enhanced competition dampens the
return to R&D through a reduction in the domestic market share of each rm (market
share eect of competition); yet, it also increases the return to R&D through a depreci-
ation of markups, which expands the domestic market (markups eect of competition).
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Thus, overall trade opening between two countries has an ambiguous eect on their
equilibrium R&D eorts.
In addition, trade liberalization between any two countries aects R&D decisions of
rms in other countries, too. For example, when i and j negotiate a trade agreement,
R&D eorts of other direct trade partners of i and j are aected because rms in these
countries face higher competition in i and j. Then, the impact on R&D eorts of the
direct trade partners of i and j "spreads" to a larger network: direct trade partners of
the direct trade partners of i and j face dierent R&D eorts and hence, competitive
power of their trade partners, which has an impact on their own optimal R&D, etc.
Thus, scale and competition eects of trade liberalization (in any part of the network)
can reinforce or dampen the incentive for rms to invest in R&D, the sign and strength of
the impact being determined by the precise network structure. In the following section,
this issue is addressed in case of multilateral and regional trade liberalization, where
each type of liberalization is represented by the specic type of network.
1.6 Two scenarios of trade liberalization: Multilateralism
versus regionalism
Scenario 1: Symmetric network of trade agreements. Multilateral trade
system
Consider a class of symmetric networks of degree n  1. A symmetric, or regular,
network of degree n is a network where every node has the same number n of direct
contacts. Given the aim of the paper, we are mainly interested in one representative
of this class { a complete network. A complete network of degree greater than one
represents a multilateral trade system, where all participant countries have a trade
agreement with each other and neither country has a trade agreement with a third party.
In this framework, an expansion of the multilateral trade system represents a scenario
of multilateral trade liberalization. When multilateral trade liberalization involves all
world economies, the resulting trade system is a "global free trade".
In addition, the class of symmetric networks comprises a case of one or several simple
bilaterals, where every country signs a trade agreement with one and only one other
country.17 This case corresponds to the symmetric network of degree one.
17Up to the early 1990s, trade agreements were, with only a few exceptions, a set of non-intersecting
bilateral or "small" multilateral trade agreements (the latter are also called plurilateral RTAs). The
source of this evidence is for example, Lloyd and Maclaren (2004).
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Figure 1.1: Complete network of degree 7 { multilateral trade agreement between 8
countries
In the symmetric network, all countries/rms are identical and hence, exert identical
R&D eorts. Denote the level of this eort by x. Then the (single) rst-order condi-









(n + 1)(n   1)





From this equation, the equilibrium eort x can be computed to be
x =







Now, using this expression for x and (1.12) for the equilibrium prot function, we derive
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The usual comparative statics analysis leads to the following result:
Proposition 1.1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for all n <  n, where  n  1.
Then for any n <  n, rm's equilibrium R&D eort x is monotonically increasing in n,
while rm's prot  is monotonically decreasing in n.
Proposition 1.1 is illustrated with Figure 1.2, where the equilibrium R&D eort and the
prot of a rm in the symmetric network are drawn against the network degree n.18
18The simulation is done for the specic parameter values:  = 7, b = 1,  n = 10, and  = 2; a and 
fulll Assumptions 1 and 2.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium R&D eort and prot of a country in a symmetric network
of degree n
Proposition 1.1 suggests that multilateral trade liberalization depreciates rms' prots.
However, the incentive for rms to invest in R&D increase. The intuition for this result
is easy to grasp. As a new country enters the multilateral trade agreement (or any
other agreement which can be represented by the symmetric network), the reduction in
the domestic and foreign market shares suered by each rm is exactly compensated
by participation in the entrant's market. That is, the negative market share eect of
increased competition is exactly compensated by the positive scale eect associated with
access to a new market. As a result, trade liberalization aects R&D only through the
reduction in markups { the remaining component of the competition eect. Since the
reduction in markups increases the aggregate market size of a rm, the optimal R&D of
each rm in the multilateral agreement is increasing in the size of the agreement.
On the other hand, Figure 1.2 shows that the rates of increase in R&D and decrease in
prots are both declining as the number of participant countries (size of the agreement)
grows. This observation is implied by the fact that the markup-reducing eect of trade
liberalization in the multilateral agreement is declining in the size of the agreement.
Basically, using the denition of the demand function in (1.1), I nd that the price of
the good in each market is given by the decreasing and convex function of n:
p =
b(n + 2)(a + (n + 1) + n)   a(n + 1)2
 (n + 1)2 + b(n + 2)2 (1.15)
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Figure 1.3: Price on the market of a country in a symmetric network of degree n
Furthermore, notice that Proposition 1.1 allows for the comparison of equilibrium R&D
eort and an individual rm's prot in a multilateral agreement with those in a bilateral
agreement or in autarky. Denote by x
a and a the equilibrium R&D eort and the
prot of a rm in autarky, by x
b and b, the R&D eort and the prot of a rm in the
bilateral agreement, and by x(n) and (n), the R&D eort and the prot of a rm in
the multilateral agreement of degree n (of size n + 1). Then we obtain
Corollary For any 2  n <  n, x
a < x
b < x(n) and a > b > (n).
The individual R&D investment of a rm is higher in the multilateral agreement than in
the bilateral agreement or in autarky, while the prot of a rm in multilateral agreement
is the lowest.
Finally, for aggregate levels of R&D, Proposition 1.1 and the Corollary imply that the
aggregate level of R&D activities within the multilateral trade system is increasing in
the size of the system and exceeds the aggregate R&D eort of the same number of
countries where each country has negotiated one bilateral trade agreement.
Scenario 2: Asymmetric network of trade agreements. Hub-and-spoke trade
system
I now examine the case of regional trade liberalization. In the process of regional trade
liberalization, some countries (or groups of countries) negotiate one or several bilateral
and/or plurilateral agreements with each other. Thus, in contrast to the multilateral type
of liberalization considered in Scenario 1, each country may actually be a party to several
dierent trade agreements where other countries do not necessarily have an agreement
with each other. As a result, a complex trade system emerges where various regional
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(preferential) agreements overlap. In the literature, this system is often described as a
hub-and-spoke trade system, where some countries (hubs) have a relatively large number
of direct trade partners as compared to other countries (spokes), which are mainly
involved in trade agreements with hubs.
In this model, I approximate the hub-and-spoke structure by the asymmetric network
with two types of nodes { nodes of high degree n (hubs) and of low degree m (spokes),
1  m < n. I assume that a xed positive share of direct trade partners of hubs and
spokes is represented by countries of the opposite type. For any hub, other hubs form a
share 0    < 1 of its direct trade partners while a share 0 < 1      1 is represented
by spokes. Similarly, for any spoke, other spokes form a share 0  ' < 1 of its direct
trade partners and the remaining positive share 0 < 1 '  1 is represented by hubs.19
The assumption of xed (and identical across countries of the same type) shares   and
' signicantly simplies calculations and enriches the comparative statics analysis. For
example, it facilitates the study of the eects of variation in the proportion of hubs to
spokes among countries' direct trade partners while the number of these direct trade
partners remains unchanged.20
Some examples of the hub-and-spoke trade system are demonstrated in Table 1.1.
In any given hub-and-spoke trade system, all hubs exert identical R&D eort (xh) and
likewise, all spokes exert identical R&D eort (xs). Then the system (1.10) of the
rst-order conditions reduces to two equations:

  (1    )n
(m + 1)2
(m + 2)2   (n  + 1)
(n + 1)2
(n + 2)2 + b +  n
2(n + 1)
(n + 2)2 + (1.16)
+ (1    )n
m + 1
(m + 2)2((1   ')m   1) +  n
n + 1
(n + 2)2( n   1)

 xh +
+ (1    )n

n + 1
(n + 2)2 +
m + 1
(m + 2)2 +
n + 1





= (a      2)

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(n + 2)2(a    + n)
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  (1   ')m
(n + 1)2
(n + 2)2   ('m + 1)
(m + 1)2
(m + 2)2 + b + 'm
2(m + 1)
(m + 2)2 + (1.17)
+ (1   ')m
n + 1
(n + 2)2((1    )n   1) + 'm
m + 1
(m + 2)2('m   1)

 xs +
+ (1   ')m

n + 1
(n + 2)2 +
m + 1
(m + 2)2 +
n + 1















(m + 2)2(a    + m)
19Notice that in case when   = 1 (' = 1), we obtain the complete network of degree n (m).
20See Proposition 1.2.
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Table 1.1: Examples of hub-and-spoke trade system
Network characteristics Network
Type 1: Single star (n bilaterals of a hub with spokes)
n > 1, m = 1,   = 0, ' = 0
Type 2: Stars with linked hubs
n > 1, m = 1,   > 0, ' = 0
Type 3: Stars sharing spokes
n > 1, m > 1,   = 0, ' = 0
Type 4: Stars with linked hubs, sharing spokes
n > 1, m > 1,   > 0, ' = 0
Type 5: Stars where some spokes are linked with ech other
n > 1, m > 1,   = 0, ' > 0
Remark: Red nodes stand for hubs, green nodes stand for spokes.
These equations uniquely identify equilibrium R&D eorts of a hub and a spoke. Ex-
tensive calculations lead to the closed-form solution (x
h, x
s), which has a cumbersome
representation and therefore, is left for the Appendix.21
Consider the impact of trade liberalization in the hub-and-spoke trade system on equi-
librium R&D eorts x
h, x
s. In contrast to the case with the multilateral trade system,
in the asymmetric hub-and-spoke structure, the negative component of the competi-
tion eect of trade liberalization (market share eect of competition) is generally not
compensated by the positive scale eect. Therefore, a priori, the impact of trade liberal-
ization on R&D in the hub-and-spoke system is ambiguous. However, the comparative
statics of x
h and x
s reveal some insights about the eects of an expansion/variation of
the hub-and-spoke trade structure on the R&D eort of a rm.
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for all m < n   n, where
 n > 1. Then there exists  > 0 such that for any    and for any m < n <  n, the
following statements are fullled:
21See the proof of Proposition 1.2 in Appendix B.
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1. the equilibrium R&D eort x
h of a hub is monotonically increasing in n and mono-
tonically decreasing in m and in  ;
2. the equilibrium R&D eort x
s of a spoke is monotonically decreasing in n and
monotonically increasing in '. Furthermore, x
s is monotonically increasing in m
if at least one of the conditions holds:
(a) the trade costs are suciently high:  
1 '
3 2'(a   )
(b) the share of other spokes among direct trade partners is at least 1=3: '  1
3
(c) the gap between n and m is relatively small: n  m2, that is, 1 < n
m  m
Proposition 1.2 states that as soon as the specied parameter restrictions hold (including
conditions (a) { (c)), the equilibrium R&D eort of a hub (spoke) is increasing in the
number of its direct trade partners but is decreasing in the number of direct trade
partners of spokes (hubs). In addition, for both a hub and a spoke, the higher the
share of hubs among their direct trade partners, the lower the optimal R&D eort.
Thus, the larger the number of directly accessible markets and the lower the number
of competitors in these markets, the higher the incentive for rms to innovate. This
observation suggests that, in the hub-and-spoke trade system, the competition eect of
trade liberalization on rm's R&D is negative but the positive scale eect of any direct
trade partner dominates its negative competition eect.
The negative impact of competition on equilibrium R&D decisions of spokes sheds light
on conditions (a) { (c), which guarantee that an increase in m enhances spokes' R&D
investments. Recall that the specication of a hub-and-spoke trade system in this model
is such that an increase in the number of a spoke's direct trade partners m is associated
with an increase in the number of both types of partners { hubs and spokes.22 Since
the market of a hub is "small" { smaller than the market of a spoke, an increase in the
spoke's foreign market share may actually be smaller than a decrease in the share of
the domestic market. As a result, the positive scale eect of an increase in m on R&D
investment of a spoke may be dominated by the negative competition eect. Conditions
(a) { (c) ensure that this would not be the case if: (a) the trade costs of rms are
suciently high to restrict the amount of exports from new trade partners, (b) hubs
represent only a minor share of direct trade partners of a spoke, or alternatively, (c) the
number m of competitors in the spoke's market is comparable to n, so that the loss in
the domestic market share of the spoke is not larger than the gain in the market of a
new hub market.
22The proportion of spokes to hubs among the new trade partners is determined by ': the lower ',
the higher the relative number of hubs.
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The results of Proposition 1.2 are illustrated with Figures 1.5 and 1.6 in Appendix C.23
Comparison of multilateral and regional trade systems
In this section, I examine how the impacts of dierent types of trade liberalization com-
pare in terms of R&D investments of rms. The comparison is made in two steps. First,
I investigate the basic relationship between the R&D level of a rm in the multilateral
trade agreement and a rm in the regional, hub-and-spoke trade system. After that I
distinguish between dierent types of the hub-and-spoke system and study the rank-
ing of R&D eorts of rms across various types of the hub-and-spoke system and the
multilateral system. Consider each step in turn.
Step 1 To gain some insights about the sources of variation in R&D eorts of a rm
across the multilateral and the regional, hub-and-spoke trade systems, let us rst as-
sume that the demand/price for the good is the same across markets, and that all rms
operating in the market of a country obtain the same share of the market. Then, given
the xed number of direct trade partners, it is purely the number of other rms/com-
petitors present in each trade partner country that determines the aggregate market size
of a rm. The fewer competitors, the larger the aggregate market size of a rm and the
higher the return to R&D investment.
In this simplied framework, for any number n of direct trade partners, the aggregate
market size of a hub in any hub-and-spoke trade system is larger than that of a rm
in the multilateral agreement. The opposite is true for spokes. For any number m of
direct trade partners, the total market size of a spoke is smaller than that of a country
in the multilateral agreement. To clarify the rst statement, observe that while in the
multilateral agreement (of degree n), the number of competitors of a rm is n in each
of its n foreign markets, in the hub-and-spoke trade system, the number of competitors
of a hub is n only in    n of its foreign markets and it is less than n in the remaining
markets. A similar argument is applicable for spokes.
Recall that these conclusions are derived under the assumption of equal demand and
equal market shares of rms in every market. But in fact, they hold without this
assumption, too. Formally, the result is an immediate implication of Proposition 1.2
and the short proof is provided in Appendix B:
Proposition 1.3. For any 0   ;' < 1 and for any n, m > 1 such that n > m,
x
h > x(n) > x(m) > x
s
23Both gures are produced using the same parameter values as for Figure 1.2 in Scenario 1. In
addition, for Figure 1.5, I set   = ' = 0 and for Figure 1.6, n = 6, m = 2.
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Moreover, the same inequalities hold when a hub and a spoke belong not just to one, but
to any dierent types of the hub-and-spoke structure.24
Step 2 Now, I compare equilibrium R&D eorts of rms across various types of the
hub-and-spoke trade structure. To that end, I restrict attention to the specic types
of the hub-and-spoke structure presented in Table 1.1. Notice that by Proposition 1.3,
it only remains to compare separately R&D eorts of hubs and R&D eorts of spokes,
since R&D of a hub is always higher than R&D of a spoke both in one and in dierent
types of the hub-and-spoke structure.
As before, assume that the demand for the good is the same in all markets and that all
rms (hubs and spokes) share each market equally. Consider the dierences in market
sizes of hubs and spokes across various hub-and-spoke structures. With regard to hubs,
observe that for any number, n, of a hub's direct trade partners, a hub in the star (Type
1 system) enjoys the lowest competition in any of its foreign markets as compared to
hubs in the other systems. Therefore, a hub in the star has the largest total market
size. As a number of rms (competitors) in markets of a hub's direct trade partners
grows, the aggregate market size of the hub decreases. This is the case when either the
number of a spoke's direct trade partners, m, grows (Type 3 system), the share of hubs
among direct trade partners,  , increases (Type 2 system) or when both changes in m
and   happen simultaneously (Type 4 system). Furthermore, the larger the increase in
m and/or  , the smaller the size of a hub's aggregate market.
For spokes the situation is symmetric. Given any number, n, of a hub's direct trade
partners, a spoke in the star (Type 1 system) has access to a single foreign market
(m = 1). Therefore, a spoke's market in the star is smaller than a spoke's market in any
other hub-and-spoke trade system.25 As the number of direct trade partners of a spoke,
m, increases (Type 3 system), the market of a spoke expands. It expands even further if
the share of spokes among direct trade partners, ' , grows (Type 5 system). Moreover,
the larger the increase in m and/or ', the larger the aggregate market size of a spoke.
As in Step 1, the insights gained on the assumption of equal demand and equal market
shares of rms in every market prove to be valid when the assumption is relaxed. This
leads to Proposition 1.4, which is formally derived in Appendix B. To state the propo-
sition, I denote by x
hi the equilibrium R&D eort of a hub and by x
si, the equilibrium
R&D eort of a spoke in the hub-and-spoke trade system of Type i, i 2 1 : 5.
24Recall from Scenario 1 that x
(n) denotes the equilibrium R&D eort of a rm in the multilateral
agreement of degree n.
25In fact, on the assumption of equal demand and equal market shares of rms in every market, the
market size of a spoke in Type 2 system is the same as in the star.
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Proposition 1.4. Consider Types 1{5 of the hub-and-spoke trade structure. Suppose
that (i) n is the same across all types, (ii) m is the same across all types where m > 1
(Types 3, 4 and 5), and (iii)   is the same across all types where   > 0 (Types 2 and
4). Let x(n) and x(m) be dened for n and m > 1, identical to those in Types 1 {
5 of the hub-and-spoke structure. Then rms' equilibrium R&D eorts in Types 1{5 of








With respect to the equilibrium R&D eort x
h2 of a hub and x
s2 of a spoke in Type 2







Proposition 1.4 is illustrated with Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.7.
Thus, the R&D eorts of rms in the multilateral system and in various types of the
hub-and-spoke trade systems vary substantially. The highest R&D incentives exist for
a hub, especially for a hub in the star (Type 1 system), whereas for a spoke in the star
the incentives are the lowest. As the number of direct trade partners of a spoke and/or
the share of spokes (hubs) among direct trade partners of each spoke (hub) increase,
the levels of R&D investment of hubs and spokes converge. They coincide at the level
of R&D investment of a rm in the multilateral agreement, which therefore, takes an
average position: it is lower than R&D of a hub but higher than R&D of a spoke.
Further to comparing individual R&D investments by rms, I compare the aggregate
levels of R&D activities of the same total number of countries in the multilateral trade
agreement and in the star { bilateral agreements of one country (a hub) with the others
(spokes). I nd that although the individual R&D eort of a hub in the star is much
higher than the R&D eort of a single country in the multilateral agreement, the aggre-
gate R&D in the star is lower than in the multilateral agreement. This observation is
demonstrated by Figure 1.8 in Appendix C.
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium R&D eorts in the multilateral and in the hub-and-spoke
trade systems as a function of n (the upper sub-gure) and as a function of m (the
lower sub-gure).
Teteryatnikova, Mariya (2010), Essays on Applied Network Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13994Chapter 1. R&D in the Network of International Trade 23
1.7 Policy implications
The previous analysis suggests that the structure of the network of trade agreements
and the position of a country in this network are key for understanding the dierences
in R&D and productivity levels of rms across the multilateral and the regional types of
trade systems. This feeds into the ongoing debate on gains and losses of multilateralism
versus regionalism, especially with respect to the intensive proliferation of regional trade
agreements among the WTO member countries. The paper suggests that productivity
gains of regionalism versus those of multilateralism depend heavily on the relative num-
ber of regional trade agreements signed by countries. If a country signs relatively large
number of trade agreements within the regional system (core country), then its R&D
and productivity are higher than R&D and productivity of a country in the multilat-
eral system. At the same time, a country that signs relatively small number of trade
agreements within the regional system (periphery country) has lower productivity gains
than a country in the multilateral system. This observation suggests that from the per-
spective of a small economy, which normally becomes a spoke/periphery in the regional
trade system, the prospects for productivity improvements within the multilateral trade
system are generally better than within the regional system.26
In addition, the nding of the unambiguously positive impact on R&D of the multilteral
trade liberalization indicates that the expansion of the WTO as well as the consolidation
of several plurilateral blocks or their accession to the WTO enhance R&D in every
country.27
Recall that for the specic classes of networks considered in Scenario 1 and in Scenario
2, the equilibrium R&D eort of a rm is increasing in the number of its direct trade
partners (scale and competition eects of trade liberalization) but decreasing in the
number of its two-links-away trade partners (competition eect only). In Appendix
A, I further investigate the issue of the impact which direct and two-links-away trade
partners have on R&D of a rm in a generic network under the assumption of small
external eects. Consistent with the results of the previous analysis, I nd that new
direct trade partners of a rm (mostly) lead to an increase in the rm's R&D investment
and the smaller the number of competitors in the new markets, the larger the increase.
26The nding of a substantially lower R&D and productivity levels in a spoke economy as compared
to those in a hub and in a country within the multilateral system, supports the argument of earlier
studies about the disadvantageous position of spokes. For instance, Baldwin (2003), Kowalczyk and
Wonnacott (1992), Deltas et al. (2005), Lloyd and Maclaren (2004), and De Benedictis et al. (2005) nd
that welfare and income levels are lower for spokes than for hubs and than for countries in the complete
network.
27According to Fiorentino et al. (2007), the number of merging regional trade agreements is currently
increasing. Examples include EC-GCC, SACU-MERCOSUR, among others.
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1.8 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of international trade with rm-level productivity im-
provements via R&D. Firms in dierent countries sell their product and compete in a
Cournot fashion with other rms in the domestic market and in the markets of their
trade partners. The trade partners of any country/rm are dened by the network of
trade agreements: countries which are linked in the network are (direct) trade partners
of each other.
I focus on two specic types of networks: the complete and the hub-and-spoke network.
In the model, these networks represent trade arrangements which arise as a result of
multilateral or regional trade liberalization, respectively. I study how the structure
of the trade arrangement and the position of a country in this structure aect R&D
investments by rms. In this manner, I address the issue of the dierence in the impact
of multilateral and regional types of trade liberalization on rms' R&D and productivity.
I show that the R&D response of rms to trade liberalization is the net outcome of
two dierent eects: one, stimulating R&D through the creation of new markets (scale
eect), and the other, deterring or improving R&D through the emergence of new com-
petitors (competition eect). I nd that the sizes of both eects vary across the multi-
lateral and the regional/hub-and-spoke trade systems. Basically, a new country entering
the multilateral or the hub-and-spoke trade system represents dierent "value added"
for rms in every system since the eective size of the new market and the competitive
impact of the new rm depend on the structure of the trade system.
The variations in the scale eect and the competition eect of trade across structures
lead to variations in rms' aggregate market sizes. In turn, the dierence in rms'
market sizes explains the dierence in levels of rms' R&D investments. For the same
number of direct trade partners, the R&D eort of a hub in the hub-and-spoke trade
system is higher than the R&D eort of a country in the multilateral agreement. On
the other hand, R&D of a spoke is lower than R&D of a hub and lower than R&D of a
country in the multilateral agreement, even if a country in the multilateral agreement
has the same number of direct trade partners as a spoke.
In addition, consistent with the empirical evidence, I nd that a new market increases
R&D of a rm in the multilateral system and R&D of a hub in the regional system. It
also increases R&D of a spoke, at least as soon as the level of competition in the new
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spoke's trade partner is not too high.28 Furthermore, for the aggregate levels of R&D
activities, I nd that the aggregate R&D eort within the multilateral trade agreement
exceeds that in the star { the simplest representative of the hub-and-spoke trade system.
The paper suggests some policy implications. For example, with regard to benets and
losses of regionalism versus multilateralism, the paper indicates that the regional trade
liberalization is likely to be more benecial than the multilateral trade liberalization
for R&D and productivity level of hubs, countries which sign suciently many regional
trade agreements. At the same time, R&D and productivity level of spokes are higher
if the countries choose the multilateralist alternative.
Lastly, it is important to emphasize that the results of this paper are driven purely
by the scale eect and the competition eect of trade liberalization, which are in turn
determined by the structural characteristics of trade agreements. In order to precisely
isolate the impact of the structure of trade agreements, the model abstracts from other
channels through which trade liberalization may aect R&D. For example, the R&D
spillover eect and the rms selection eect of trade are excluded.29 Additionally, for the
sake of simplicity, the model disregards important inequalities in terms of geographical
size and initial income/resources across countries. These limitations of the paper suggest
directions for further research. In particular, empirical testing of the model could provide
more insights.
28Recall that in the regional hub-and-spoke trade system, R&D of a spoke declines in response to
a new market opening if the negative competition eect on R&D of the spoke's new trade partners
outweighs the positive scale eect. However, by simulating the model for the star network under various
parameter assumptions, I nd that initiating trade with the hub decreases R&D of a spoke when the
number of competitors in the hub's market is "unrealistically high" (more than 100).
29As suggested by Melitz (2003), the rms selection eect results from the initial dierence in produc-
tivity of multiple domestic rms in each country and from the existence of the xed costs of production
and exporting.
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1.9 Appendix
Appendix A: Equilibrium R&D eorts in arbitrary network. The case
of small external eects
Consider the system of rst-order optimality conditions (1.10). Below I study the prop-
erties of the solution to this system when the magnitude of local eects { eects of
interaction between rms in the network { is arbitrarily small. I seek the ranking of
optimal R&D decisions of rms in accordance with simple characteristics of rms' posi-
tions in the network, such as the nodal degrees and the sum of neighbors' degrees. To
derive this ranking, I employ the asymptotic approach suggested by Bloch and Qu erou
(2008).30
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(I   B)  x = ~ u (1.18)
where  = 1
b. In this system, matrix B is the matrix of local eects. Below, I
investigate the solution to (1.18) when the norm of matrix B capturing the magnitude
of local eects is small.
First, following Bloch and Qu erou (2008), I dene a vector sequence f = (c1;c2;:::;cm;:::),
where each vector cm is given by:
cm = m~ uBm 1
30As emphasized in Bloch and Qu erou (2008), at least two arguments can defend the usefulness of
studying network eects whose magnitude is small. First, when the matrix of interactions is complex,
this may be the only way to evaluate the equilibrium R&D decisions for an arbitrary network structure.
Secondly, by continuity, the insights obtained for small external eects continue to hold as the magnitude
of externalities increases.
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The rst terms of this sequence are
c1 = ~ u;
c2 = 2~ uB;
c3 = 3~ uB2
Using the sequence f, I can now state the approximation result, which provides an
equivalence between the ranking of the components of the solution x to (1.18) and the
lexicographic ordering of the components of f when the magnitude of kBk is close to
zero.
Proposition 1.5. Consider a system of linear equations (1.18). Suppose that kBk is
suciently small:31 for a given 0 <  " < 1, kBk   "
N. Then there exists a unique
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j for all m < M.
Thus, if the upper bound for the magnitude of local eects is close to zero,
x
i > x
j , fi  fj
where fi  fj stands for lexicographic dominance of fi over fj. This means that in order
to compare equilibrium R&D eorts of dierent rms, one can restrict attention to the
rst order term c1, or if the rst order terms are equal, to the second order term c2,
etc. As a result, the ranking of optimal R&D choices of rms reduces to the ranking of
characteristics of rms' positions in the network.





for some 0 <  " < 1, then the dierence between x
i and x
i0 can be approximated by
the dierence between ~ ui and ~ ui0 such that the measurement error does not exceed
   "K+1
1  "  2k~ uk, where
k~ uk = max
i




(jNjj + 2)2 + (a    + jNij)
jNij + 1
(jNij + 2)2
31As in Bloch and Qu erou (2008), I use the l1 vector norm dened by kAk = max
i;j
jaijj
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So, when the local eects are small, the R&D eort chosen by rm i is at least as high
as the R&D eort of rm i0 if and only if




(jNjj + 2)2 + (a    + jNij)
jNij + 1
(jNij + 2)2  (1.19)




(jNjj + 2)2 + (a    + jNi0j)
jNi0j + 1
(jNi0j + 2)2
The inequality (1.19) suggests that at the rst order the R&D eort of rm i is decreasing
in the number jNjj, j 2 Ni, of i's two-links-away trade partners. In addition, the R&D
eort of rm i is increasing in the number jNij of i's direct trade partners as soon as the






(jNj0j + 2)2 > 0
Alternatively, this can be written as:
(a      2)
jNj0j + 1
(jNj0j + 2)2 >
jNij2 + 3jNij + 1
(jNij + 2)2(jNij + 3)2(a    + jNij)  
jNij + 2
(jNij + 3)2 (1.20)
It is easy to see that under Assumption 1 the left-hand side of inequality (1.20) is
decreasing in jNj0j. This means that the additional direct trade partner j0 of i increases
i's incentives to innovate as soon as the number of competitors jNj0j of i in market j0 is
suciently low. Thus, in accordance with the earlier discussion in the paper, opening
trade with an additional trade partner increases the R&D investment of rm i if the
actual market size of the new trade partner is large enough.
The nding of a positive eect of direct trade partners and a negative eect of two-links-
away trade partners of i on i's equilibrium R&D eort, together with the conditions
which guarantee these eects, are consistent with the ndings of Scenarios 1 and 2
discussed in Section 1.6.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Derivation of the prot function in (1.12)
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Proof of Proposition 1.1
First, notice that in case of a symmetric network of degree n, the right-hand side of
inequality in Assumption 1 is an increasing function of n and also the right-hand side
of inequality in Assumption 2 is an increasing function of n, provided that Assumption
1 holds. Therefore, for Assumptions 1 and 2 to be fullled for all n <  n, it is enough to
ensure that these assumptions hold for n =  n. The resulting restrictions are




( n + 1)
( n + 2)2(( n + a)( n + 1)    n) (1.22)
The proof of Proposition 1.1 is established in two steps.
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1. R&D eort x is monotonically increasing in n
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The sign of this derivative is positive as soon as
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One can readily see that this inequality holds due to the restriction on a in (1.21).
2. Prot, , is monotonically decreasing in n
Due to the computational complexity, I present only a schematic proof of this
statement.
Taking the derivative of  in (1.14) with respect to n, we obtain the expression
represented by the product of the ratio 1
b(2n 4b+n2 4bn bn2+1)3 and the quadratic
polynomial of . The ratio is negative for any n  1 due to the restriction on 
in (1.22). On the other hand, the value of the polynomial is positive for any
n  1 as soon as parameters satisfy the restrictions (1.21) and (1.22). The latter
is established via two steps.
 First, I nd that due to the restriction (1.22) the coecient of the polynomial
at the quadratic term 2 is negative for any given n  1. Besides, the constant
term is positive. Hence, the graph of the quadratic function is a parabola
with downward-directed branches and two real roots { one positive and one
negative.
 Since the unit trade cost  is positive and by the restriction (1.21), it does
not exceed 1
2(a   ), to establish that the value of the polynomial is positive
for all  2 (0; 1
2(a )), it suces to show that the value of the polynomial is
positive at  := 1
2(a ). One can nd that this is indeed the case, provided
that (1.21) and (1.22) hold.
Thus, for all n  1 and any parameter values satisfying the conditions (1.21)
and (1.22), the derivative of  with respect to n is negative, so that the prot
function is decreasing in n.

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Sketch of the proof of Proposition 1.2
Notice that to ensure that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for all m < n   n, it is enough to
impose the restrictions:





 n + 1
( n + 2)2  n( n + a   2) +
2
9
(( n + a)( n + 1)    n)

(1.24)
The equilibrium R&D eort of a hub and a spoke are given by the solution to the system




(a      2)(1   ')m(n + 1)(m + 2)2+
+(m + 1)(n + 2)2







b(m + 2)2   n(1    )(m + 1)(2 + 'm)

 










(a      2)

n (n + 1)(m + 2)
2 + (n   n )(m + 1)(n + 2)
2 
+
+(n + 1)(m + 2)




b(m + 2)2   n(1    )(m + 1)(2 + 'm)

 





  (1   ')m(m + 2)2(n  + 2)(n + 1) + (n + 2)2b(m + 2)2 
 (n + 2)2




 (1   ')(1    )mn





(a      2)
 
n (n + 1)(m + 2)2 + (n   n )(m + 1)(n + 2)2
+
+(n + 1)(m + 2)2(a    + n)   x
s(n   n )
 
(m + 1)(n + 2)2+
+(n + 1)(m + 2)2 + 'm(m + 1)(n + 2)2 + n (n + 1)(m + 2)2
b(n + 2)2(m + 2)2   (n  + 1)(n + 1)2(m + 2)2 
 (n   n )(m + 1)2(n + 2)2 + n (2n + 2)(m + 2)2+
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Taking a derivative of x
h and x
s with respect to each of the parameters m, n, ' and
 , we obtain a ratio, where the denominator is unambiguously positive while the sign
of the numerator is determined by the sign of a cubic polynomial in . As soon as  is
suciently large { greater than the largest real root of the polynomial, the sign of the
polynomial is dened by the sign of the coecient at the highest degree.
Thus, to simplify calculations, I assume that  is large enough ( > ) and focus
on the sign of the polynomial's coecient at 3. I obtain that under the parameter















@' are positive. As regarding the derivative
@x
s
@m, this derivative is positive if
and only if the following inequality holds:
(a  2)(1 ')A+(a  2)B+ C > (a  2)(1 ')D (a  2)'E
(1.25)
where
A = m6n4 + 7m6n3 + 18m6n2 + 20m6n + 8m6 + 12m5n4 + 84m5n3 + 216m5n2 +
+240m5n + 96m5;
B =  30m4n4' + 50m4n4   300m4n3' + 380m4n3   840m4n2' + 1000m4n2  
 960m4n' + 1120m4n   384m4' + 448m4 + 40m3n4' + 100m3n4  
 320m3n3' + 880m3n3   1280m3n2' + 2400m3n2   1600m3n' + 2720m3n  
 640m3' + 1088m3 + 240m2n4' + 120m2n4 + 240m2n3' + 1200m2n3  
 480m2n2' + 3360m2n2   960m2n' + 3840m2n   384m2' + 1536m2 + 288mn4'
+112mn4 + 576mn3' + 1024mn3 + 384mn2' + 2816mn2 + 3200mn + 1280m +
+16n5' + 96n4' + 64n4 + 192n3' + 448n3 + 128n2' + 1152n2 + 1280n + 512;
C = 160n4 + 1024m + 1280n + 768m2 + 256m3 + 32m4 + 1280n2 + 640n3 + 512 +
+16n5 + 1929m2n2 + 960m2n3 + 640m3n2 + 320m3n3 + 80m4n2 + 24m2n5 +
+80m3n4 + 40m4n3 + 1286mn3 + 8m3n5 + 10m4n4 + m4n5 + 2560mn +
+2560mn2 + 1920m2n + 640m3n + 80m4n + 32mn5 + 320mn4 + 240m2n4;
D = m4n5 + 6m3n5 + 12m2n5 + 8mn5;
E = 2m4n5 + 14m3n5 + 36m2n5 + 40mn5
Notice that A, B, C, D, and E are all positive, so that the left-hand side of (1.25)
is positive, while the sign of the right-hand side is determined by the relative values of
(1 ')D and 'E. It is easy to see that 2D < E. Hence, for '  1=3, (1 ')D < 'E
and the right-hand side of (1.25) are negative. This establishes condition (b) of the
proposition.
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Observe also that C > D. Then as soon as   (a      2)(1   '), inequality (1.25)
holds. This justies condition (a).
Finally, condition (c) follows from the series of inequalities. First, when n  m2,
A > m4n5 + 12m3n5 + 7m2n5 + 84mn5 (1.26)
Secondly, since m > n,
m4n5 + 12m3n5 + 7m2n5 + 84mn5 > m4n5 + 6m3n5 + 13m2n5 + 84mn5 > D (1.27)
Combining (1.26) and (1.27), we obtain that A > D, so that inequality (1.25) is satised.

Proof of Proposition 1.3
First, notice that a complete network of degree n (m) can be regarded as a hub-and-
spoke network "composed only of hubs", that is, where   = 1 (composed only of spokes
where ' = 1). Then inequality x
h > x(n) follows from part 1 of Proposition 1.2,
stating that x
h is decreasing in  . Similarly, x(m) > x
s is implied by the result that
x
s is increasing in '. Lastly, the inequality x(n) > x(m) follows from Proposition 1.1.

Proof of Proposition 1.4












h is decreasing in m, while x
h3 > x
h4 > x(n) since x
h is decreasing in  . Similarly,




s is increasing in ', while x
s3 > x
s1 since x
s is increasing in m. The intermediate
inequality x(n) > x(m) is a result of Proposition 1.1.
Likewise, with regard to the equilibrium R&D eorts x
h2 and x
s2 in Type 2 system, the
inequality x
h1 > x
h2 follows from the fact that x





s2 are the result of x
h and x
s being decreasing and increasing in m, respectively.

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Proof of Proposition 1.5
The proof is suggested by the proof of Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 7.1 in Bloch and Qu erou
(2008).
Consider the system of linear equations (1.18). Since kBk   "
N < 1
N, Lemma 7.1 in
Bloch and Qu erou (2008) states that (1.18) possesses a unique solution and








1    "














1    "








1    "
(1.28)
Consider a pair (i;j) of players and let M be the rst element of the sequences fi, fj
such that cM
i 6= cM





j )j  2 
 "K+1k~ uk
1    "
This concludes the proof.

Appendix C: Figures
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium R&D eorts in the hub-and-spoke trade system as a function
of n (the upper sub-gure) and as a function of m (the lower sub-gure).
Figure 1.6: Equilibrium R&D eorts in the hub-and-spoke trade system as a function
of   (the upper sub-gure) and as a function of ' (the lower sub-gure).
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium R&D eorts in Type 2 system as compared to R&D eorts in
other hub-and-spoke systems and to R&D of a country in the multilateral agreement.
Figure 1.8: Aggregate equilibrium R&D eorts of n countries in the star and in the
multilateral agreement.
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Resilience of the Interbank
Network to Shocks and Optimal
Bail-Out Strategy: Advantages of
"Tiered" Banking Systems
2.1 Introduction
One of the major concerns in recent policy debates over nancial stability is how "tiering"
in the banking system may impact on so-called systemic risk, the large-scale breakdown
of nancial intermediation due to the domino eect of insolvency.1 The tiered banking
system is commonly dened as an organization of lending-borrowing relations/linkages
between banks, where relatively few rst-tier or "head" institutions have a large num-
ber of interbank linkages, whereas many second-tier or "peripheral" banks have only
few links. First-tier banks are connected to second-tier banks and are also connected
with each other, whereas second-tier banks are almost exclusively connected to rst-tier
banks. Interbank linkages may act as a device for co-insurance against uncertain liquid-
ity shocks (Bhattachrya and Gale (1987)) and/or improve market discipline by providing
incentives for peer-monitoring (Flannery (1996) and Rochet and Tirole (1996)) but can
also serve as a channel through which problems in one bank spread to another.
Tiered banking systems are found in a range of countries but the empirical evidence
of contagion risk in these systems is mixed. In their 2003 Financial System Stability
assessment of the United Kingdom, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlights
1The domino eect of insolvency occurs when the non-repayment of interbank obligations by the
failing bank jeopardizes the ability of its creditor banks to meet their obligations to interbank creditors.
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the potential contagion risk arising from the highly tiered structure of the U.K. large-
value payment systems. However, several subsequent studies including Wells (2004),
Harrison et al. (2005), Lasaosa and Tudela (2008) report relatively limited scope for
contagion among U.K. banks. Boss et al. (2004b) and Degryse and Nguyen (2005)
nd that tiered banking systems in Austria and Belgium are stable and systemic crises
are unlikely. By contrast, Upper and Worms (2004) suggests that in the structurally
similar banking system in Germany, "the eects of the breakdown of a single bank could
potentially be very strong" (p. 847) and system-wide bank failures are possible. In
addition, somewhat dierently from other studies, Elsinger et al. (2006) and Mistruilli
(2007) nd that while contagious failures in tiered Austrian and Italian banking systems
are relatively rare, large parts of the system are aected in the worst-case scenarios.
The controversy in the empirical literature leaves the question of benets and risks of
tiering open for further investigation. In this paper, I aim to shed more light on this
issue by proposing an analytical and simulations-based approach. I develop a simple
theoretical model to study how structural characteristics of a tiered banking system
may aect its susceptibility to systemic breakdown and the scope of the breakdown,
particularly in comparison with other types of systems.2 This enables an analysis of the
scale of bank bail-outs that might be needed to sustain the stability of tiered banking
system and allows comparing the costs of bail-outs across systems.
The banking system is modelled with a random network where nodes represent banks
and links are interbank exposures that connect any two banks with a certain predened
probability. Links in the network are directed, reecting the fact that interbank expo-
sures comprise assets as well as liabilities. An important assumption about the structure
of links is that with probability 1 the number of incoming and outgoing links of each
bank is the same. Furthermore, interbank assets of a bank are assumed to be evenly
distributed over its incoming links and the total amount of these assets is set equal across
banks.3 Admittedly, this is a restrictive framework. However it allows deriving some
results of the paper analytically and brings attention to eects of structural features of
banking systems on contagious defaults in otherwise symmetric setting.
I examine the impact of tiering in the banking system on the stability of the system
by studying the consequences of negative correlation in connectivity (known as degree)
between neighboring banks/nodes and of the highly right-skewed distribution of connec-
tivity across banks/nodes, such as for example, in the case of a power-law, or scale-free,
distribution.
2In fact, the susceptibility to systemic breakdown of every system is only evaluated in relative terms.
This allows comparative assessment of risk across various types of banking systems.
3The assumptions of even distribution of interbank assets over incoming links and identical interbank
asset positions of all banks in the system are the same as in Gai and Kapadia (2009).
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First, I model a tiered banking system with a network displaying negative degree cor-
relations (a disassortative network),4 and compare this network with other types of
structures, showing either positive degree correlations (an assortative network) or no
correlations (a neutral network). For these three types of banking networks, I employ a
numerical analysis to investigate (i) the resilience of the networks to systemic failure, (ii)
the scale of the failure if systemic crisis occurs, and (iii) the optimal bail-out strategy of
the government or of the central bank to guarantee the nancial stability of the system
at minimal costs.5 In studying the optimal bail-out strategy of the government, I re-
strict attention to a common practice of "targeted" bail-outs, that is, the policy to rst
rescue the most connected failing banks. While the cost of each bail-out is not modelled
explicitly, the optimal bail-out strategy minimizes the aggregate cost of bail-outs since
by construction, it minimizes the total number of targeted bank rescues.
I nd that both, the risk of systemic crisis and the scope of the crisis in the banking
system are minimized when the network is disassortative/tiered. Intuitively, in a disas-
sortative banking network, high-degree banks are broadly distributed over the network
and therefore, presumably form links on many paths between other banks. As a result,
with high probability an initial shock hitting a random bank reaches a high-degree bank
in a small number of "steps", gets absorbed by that bank and does not spread any
further. This implies that disassortative networks are relatively resilient to shocks. For
the same reason, targeted bail-outs are less costly in a disassortative network: while
many bank rescues may be required in assortative and neutral banking networks, in a
disassortative network, bail-outs may not be needed at all.
Further, I consider a tiered banking system as represented by the scale-free network and
study both analytically and numerically the impact of tiering in such a system on its
susceptibility to shocks. I focus on the eects of variation in the level of tiering in scale-
free networks, where the level of tiering is represented by the inverse of a parameter of the
scale-free distribution.6 In the scale-free network, the degree distribution is such that an
absolute majority of banks have very low degree whereas a few banks have high degree.
High-degree banks are mainly connected to low-degree ones and those low-degree banks
4In the next section, it is argued that even with negative degree correlation between neighboring
nodes, rst-tier highly connected banks are still likely to be connected with each other, while the prob-
ability of connectedness between second-tier low-degree banks is very small.
5The recent events triggered by the sub-prime crisis of August 2007 highlighted the criticality of
these questions. For example, recent rescue of some institutions, such as American International Group
(AIG), remains a highly disputable issue. As a rule, the main argument of policymakers in favour of
these rescues is that many yet unaected banks (across the national or international nancial system)
might be exposed to the defaulting institutions. But in fact, no rigorous assessment is suggested of how
far contagion could have spread had AIG been allowed to fail.
6The parameter of the scale-free degree distribution governs the rate at which probability decays
with connectivity. Therefore, for smaller values of this parameter, the fraction of highly-connected
banks in the network is larger and so is the probability that poorly-connected banks are linked with
highly-connected banks rather than with each other.
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rarely have links anywhere else. Some empirical studies nd close parallels to scale-free
networks in real-world tiered banking systems. For example, Boss et al. (2004) conrms
that the Austrian interbank market has a scale-free structure. An advantage of using the
scale-free distribution to study tiered network structures is its analytical tractability. In
the simplied framework of absent degree correlations, the scale-free distribution allows
obtaining the exact closed-form solution for the threshold at which systemic failure can
occur and government intervention is needed.
I nd that the resilience of scale-free banking networks to systemic breakdown is in-
creasing and the maximal expected number of required bail-outs is decreasing in the
level of tiering. When the system is more tiered, links emanating from and arriving
at highly-connected banks span a larger part of the banking system. This implies that
initial shocks at any part of the system reach highly-connected banks "quickly" and with
large probability subside at these banks. Therefore, the resilience of such a system to
global breakdown is higher and the expected number of necessary targeted bail-outs is
lower than in a system with lower tiering.
Thus, the ndings of this paper demonstrate the advantages of tiering in the banking
network. This highlights some specic regulatory issues. For example, with regard to
stability-improvement of the interbank market, the results suggest that regulation should
promote the tiered structure of interbank relations since this can reduce systemic risk.
Furthermore, when designing the optimal bail-out policy, regulators should consider
specic features of the degree distribution underlying the pattern of connections in the
banking network. This may help to determine the limits of government regulation when
confronted with systemic shock, so as to guarantee the global stability of the system at
minimal cost.
To solve the model, I apply techniques from the literature on complex networks (Strogatz
(2001), Newman et al. (2001), Vega-Redondo (2007)) to a nancial system setting. I
use these techniques to model contagion stemming from unexpected shock to a single
institution in complex banking networks. The banking system and transmission of shocks
are modelled as in Gai and Kapadia (2009). However, I focus on the impact of tiering in
the banking system on the risk and potential scope of defaults, while Gai and Kapadia
(2009) examine the susceptibility to shocks of a uniform (Poisson) banking network,
where each possible directed link is present with independent and identical probability.
I show that when the degree distribution is not highly skewed, disregarding degree
correlations between banks may substantially change the predictions for the risk and
scale of systemic defaults in the tiered banking network.
Within the complex network literature, I exploit results from the standard epidemic/in-
formation diusion and percolation literature. Specically, the framework builds on the
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generating-function techniques used in the SI(R) models7 of Watts (2002), Callaway et
al. (2000), Cohen et al. (2001), and Newman (2002b), and in the structured network
model of Newman (2002a). This literature describes the behavior of connected groups
of nodes in a random network, with or without internode degree correlations, and char-
acterizes phase transition, the point at which extensive contagion outbreaks occur, as
well as the size of a susceptible cluster beyond that point.
Unlike the generic, undirected network models of Watts (2002) and Newman (2002a),
the model in this paper provides an explicit characterization of balance sheets, which
species the direction of links connecting banks in the nancial system. The distinction
between incoming links (claims) and outgoing links (obligations) implies that in contrast
to epidemiological and percolation models, greater connectivity does not only create
more channels through which contagion can spread but also improves counteracting risk-
sharing benets, since exposures are diversied across a larger set of banks. Moreover,
whereas in most epidemiological models the susceptibility of a node to contagion is
determined solely by the total number of its infected neighbors, in the present setup the
share of neighbors that default determines the contagion risk.
An alternative approach to studying contagion in nancial networks is represented by
the seminal contribution of Allen and Gale (2000) and by more recent literature on
endogenous network formation (Leitner (2005), Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007)). These
studies are based on small networks with rigid structures and provide key insights into
the mechanism through which the pattern of interconnectedness between banks aects
the spread of defaults. However, being restricted to the analysis of simple networks,
this literature is limited in addressing the case of real-world contagion in large and
complex banking systems. For the same reason the representation of tiered systems
in this approach is conned to a very limited set of cases.8 In contrast, the complex
network approach allows for a wide range of network structures with arbitrarily large
number of banks. Furthermore, given the scarce information that policymakers have
about the true interlinkages involved, the connections between banks are, perhaps, best
captured by a random network.
At the same time a natural critique of the approach in this paper is that it assumes that
interbank connections are formed randomly and exogenously and are static in nature.
7SI(R) (susceptible-infected (-recovered)) models are canonical epidemiological models, where the life
history of each node passes from being susceptible (S), to becoming infected (I) and, in the SIR setting,
to nally being recovered (the denition based on Vega-Redondo (2007, p.75)). The primary theoretical
approach used in the SI(R) context is the generating-function analysis.
8For example, one representation of a tiered structure in the deterministic network setting is the
"money center bank" structure proposed by Freixas et al. (2000). They consider a model with three
banks, where the banks on the periphery are linked to the bank at the center but not to each other. In
this framework, they nd that for some parameter values the failure of a bank on the periphery will not
trigger the breakdown of other institutions while the failure of the money center bank would.
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This leads to modelling contagion in a relatively mechanical manner, keeping balance
sheets and the structure of interbank linkages xed as default propagates through the
system. Yet, as suggested by Gai and Kapadia (2008), this framework still yields a useful
and realistic benchmark for the analysis. Arguably, in crises contagion spreads rapidly
through the system and banks have little time to change their behavior before they
are aected. Moreover, banks have no choice over whether to default, which precludes
strategic behavior on networks of the type assumed in Morris (2000), Jackson and Yariv
(2007) and Galeotti and Goyal (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model and
describes the structure of the banking network, the transmission process for contagion,
and the generating-function approach to measure the extent of contagion and phase
transition. Section 2.3 uses the introduced techniques to study the eects of a failure
of an individual institution on the risk and extent of system-wide contagion in tiered




Consider a banking system represented by a network where each node is a bank and
each link represents a directional lending relationship between two banks. Two crucial
properties of this network are that it is (i) directed and (ii) random. The rst property
implies that links in the network are directed, so that every node has two degrees: an
in-degree, the number of links that point into the node, and an out-degree, the number
of links that point out. Incoming links to a bank reect the interbank assets of the
bank, that is, funds owed to the bank by a counterparty. In contrast, outgoing links
from a bank indicate its interbank liabilities. Randomness of the network means that
any two banks are linked with a certain predened probability, so that the connectivity,
or degree, of each bank is not deterministic but random. In case of a directed random
network, the connectivity of nodes is described by the joint probability distribution of
in- and out-degrees. I assume a specic form of the joint distribution such that with
probability 1 in- and out-degrees of each node are the same:
Assumption 1 pjk = p(k)jk
where j denotes in-degree of a bank, k denotes out-degree, and jk is the Kronecker
delta, i.e. jk = 1 if j = k but 0 otherwise. By denition, p(k) is the probability
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that a randomly chosen node has in- and out-degrees each equal to k. The assumption
of almost surely equal number of lenders and borrowers of each bank in the interbank
market is imposed for two reasons. First, it allows for the notion of highly-connected and
"peripheral" banks in an intuitive manner: both in- and out-degree of highly-connected
banks are large and both in- and out-degree of peripheral banks are low.9 Secondly, it
simplies the discussion and the derivation of the results thereafter.10
Also in this framework, the network of interbank linkages is assumed to be formed ex-
ogenously: issues related to endogenous network formation, optimal network structures
and network eciency are left to one side.
2.2.2 Tiered network structure
A tiered banking network is dened as a network in which relatively few high-degree
(rst-tier) banksnnodes are connected with low-degree (second-tier) banksnnodes and
also connected with each other, whereas low-degree banks are almost exclusively con-
nected with high-degree banks. This property of tiering can be modelled by assuming
that the banking network shows disassortative mixing on its degrees, that is, degrees of
neighboring banks in the network are negatively correlated. It should be noticed that
even with negative degree correlations, rst-tier highly connected banks are still likely
to be linked with each other. This is explained by the fact that in any random network,
the probability of a given source node being connected to a target node is an increasing
function of the degree of the target node. Disassortativity implies that the probability of
connectedness between second-tier low-degree banks is decreased and that the probabil-
ity of connectedness between low-degree and high-degree banks is increased relative to
the situation when degree correlations between neighboring nodes are either absent or
positive. In fact, if the network displays zero or positive internode degree correlations,
low-degree banks are likely to be connected with each other, especially if the proportion
of these low-degree banks in the network is suciently large.
Alternatively, as suggested by Boss et al. (2004) and Nier et al. (2007), the same
property of tiering in banking networks can be captured by the assumption that nodes'
degree distribution is highly right-skewed. One example of such distribution is a power-
law, or scale-free, distribution. In scale-free networks, the vast majority of nodes have
small degree and nodes with high degree, although relatively few, display connectivity
9It also seems likely (although this question could be for future research) that in the real-world
interbank market, banks with a large number of outgoing links also have a large number of incoming
ones and peripheral banks have a low number of both incoming and outgoing links.
10For example, it makes the denition of internode degree correlation and joint probability distribution
of the neighboring nodes more intuitive.
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that greatly exceeds the average. As a result, high-degree nodes attach mainly to low-
degree ones and those low-degree nodes rarely have links to other nodes, including the
nodes of low-degree.
2.2.3 Bank's solvency condition
An individual bank's assets consist of external assets (investors' borrowing), denoted by
AE
i , and interbank assets (other banks' borrowing), denoted by AIB
i . As in Gai and
Kapadia (2009), the total interbank asset position of each bank is assumed to be evenly
distributed over its incoming links and independent of the number of links the bank
has11:
Assumption 2 AIB
i = jiwi; and AIB
i = AIB
k = AIB 8i 6= k
where ji is the number of incoming links of bank i and wi is the interbank assets held
by i against any of its debtor banks. These assumptions provide a useful benchmark
for studying the eects of tiering in the banking network on the potential for contagion
spread. By setting the size of interbank assets equal for all banks, they isolate the eects
of risk sharing and risk spreading as predened by the structure of interbank links. In
particular, they allow me to show that widespread contagious defaults may still occur
even if risk sharing between banks in the system is maximized.
A bank's liabilities are composed of interbank liabilities, denoted by LIB
i , and customer
deposits, denoted by Di. Since every interbank liability of a bank is another bank's
asset, interbank liabilities are determined endogenously. Customer deposits are instead
exogenous.
For any bank i the condition to be solvent can be written as12:
(1   ')AIB + AE
i   LIB
i   Di  0 (2.1)
where ' is the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that have defaulted. Here
I assume that when a linked bank defaults, bank i loses all of its interbank assets held
11Without loss of generality, each bank is assumed to have at least one incoming link, so that interbank
assets of any bank are strictly positive.
12The price of external assets is xed at 1 so that liquidity eects associated with the knock-on defaults
are ruled out. In principle, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) show that the asset price may be depressed
(become less than 1) when failed banks' assets need to be sold but nancial markets have limited overall
liquidity to absorb the assets.
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where Ki = AIB + AE
i   LIB
i   Di is the capital buer of bank i, or the net worth of a
bank, equal to the dierence between the book value of bank's assets and liabilities.
2.2.4 The transmission of shocks and bank's vulnerability
I examine the consequences of an unexpected idiosyncratic shock hitting one of the banks
in the system. This shock can be thought of as resulting from operational risk (fraud)
or credit risk.14 Although for credit risk in particular, aggregate or correlated shocks
aecting all banks at the same time may be more relevant in practice, idiosyncratic
shocks are a clearer starting point for studying contagious defaults due to interbank
exposures. Moreover, a single bank failure may actually result from an aggregate shock
which has particularly adverse consequences for one institution.15
The failure of one bank reduces the interbank asset positions of all creditor banks and
may give rise to a wave of contagious defaults in the network. In fact, the larger the
number of outgoing links of a defaulting institution, the larger the potential for the
spread of shocks. On the other hand, the impact of a bank default on the solvency of its
creditors is determined by the degree of diversication of creditors' asset portfolio. The
larger the number of incoming links of a creditor bank, the smaller the losses it incurs
due to a default of a borrowing neighbor and the lower the risk of contagious failures in
the system.
To demonstrate the latter inference, let us denote by ji the number of incoming links of
bank i. Since creditor banks each lose a fraction 1=ji of their interbank assets when a
single counterparty defaults, inequality (2.2) suggests that a default can only spread if









Following Gai and Kapadia (2009), bank i is called vulnerable if its in-degree fulls (2.3),
that is, if i is exposed to the default of a single neighbor. The other banks are called
13The same "zero recovery" assumption is made in Gai and Kapadia (2009). The authors argue that
this assumption is realistic in the midst of a crisis: in the immediate aftermath of a default, the rate and
timing of recovery are highly uncertain and banks' funders are likely to assume the worst-case scenario.
14See for example, the case of a failure of Barings in the U.K., Drexel Burnham Lambert in the U.S.
or Soci et e G en erale in France.
15In this model, the aggregate shocks can be captured through a simultaneous reduction in the capital
stocks of all banks, with a major loss for one particular bank.
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safe. According to the gures for developed countries reported by Upper (2007) and to
the calibration results in Gai and Kapadia (2009) based on data for published accounts
of large, international nancial institutions, the ratio AIB
Ki lies in the range between 5
and 6.16 In section 2.3 I will use this nding to demonstrate some of the model's results.
For simplicity, in the following I assume that capital buers of all banks are identical:
Assumption 3 Ki = Kj = K 8i 6= j
This allows denoting the right-hand side of (2.3) with a constant identical for all banks.
Let K = AIB
K . Then from condition (2.3) it is clear that given K, the vulnerability of a
bank is fully determined by its in-degree ji.
Thus, incoming and outgoing links of each bank play opposite roles in determining
the extent of contagion. Their joint eect is predetermined by the specic features
of the network structure as specied by the degree distribution. In the next section, I
introduce various types of network structures and later on study the impact of structural
characteristics on the spread of defaults in more detail.
2.2.5 The reach of contagious defaults
To compare the extent of contagious defaults and the risk of system-wide contagion
across tiered and other types of banking structures, I introduce the notion of internode
degree correlation and dene three types of networks according to the pattern of this
correlation.
Assortative, disassortative and neutral networks
Recall that the joint distribution of in- and out-degrees in the banking network is such
that with probability 1 each node has identical in- and out-degree. Let (k;k0) be the
probability that a randomly selected link goes from a node with in- and out-degree k




(k;k0) = 1; (2.4)
1 X
k0=1
(k;k0) = d(k); k = 1;2;::: (2.5)
1 X
k=1
(k;k0) = c(k0); k0 = 1;2;::: (2.6)
16Further details are available from the author.
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where d(k) represents the marginal frequency of neighboring debtor banks with in-
and out-degree k and c(k0) is the marginal frequency of neighboring creditor banks
with in- and out-degree k0. Notice however that every debtor with in- and out-degree
k is simultaneously a creditor with the same degree. This implies that the frequency
of debtor and creditor banks with degree k is the same: d(k) = c(k). I denote this
quantity (k) and call it the marginal frequency of neighboring nodes with in- and out-
degree k. Notice that (k) is dierent from p(k), the probability that a randomly chosen
node on a network has in- and out-degree k. Instead it is biased in favor of nodes of
high degree since more edges end (and start) at a high-degree node than at a low-degree
one. Therefore, the degree distribution of a neighboring node is proportional to kp(k)






If internode degree correlations are absent, the network is called neutral and (k;k0)
takes the value (k)  (k0). Otherwise, (k;k0) is dierent from this value and the
network is either assortative or disassortative. The network is called assortative if high-
degree nodes show tendency to be connected to other high-degree nodes. Conversely,
the disassortative network is one where high-degree nodes tend to attach to low-degree
ones. The amount of assortative/disassortative mixing can be quantied by the function
which represents the degree correlation between neighboring nodes:
hkk0i   hkihk0i =
1 X
k;k0=1
kk0((k;k0)   (k)(k0)) (2.8)
where h:::i indicates an average over links. This correlation is equal to zero for neutral
networks and positive or negative for assortative or disassortative networks, respectively.
For convenience of comparing dierent networks, the function in (2.8) can be normalized
by dividing by its maximal value; the value it achieves on a perfectly assortative net-
work. In the perfectly assortative network, (k;k0) = (k)kk0 and the degree correlation



















kk0((k;k0)   (k)(k0)) (2.10)
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This is the standard Pearson correlation coecient of the degrees at either end of a link
and  1  r  1.
For the purpose of further analysis, I also use the joint degree distribution of the linked
nodes, (k;k0), to obtain the collection of conditional probability distributions p(k0jk),
k = 1;2;::, where p(k0jk) denotes the conditional probability that there is a link going
from a node with in- and out-degree k to a node with in- and out-degree k0. This








; k = 1;2;::: (2.11)
Notice that if internode degree correlations are absent,
p(k0jk) = (k0) (2.12)
Throughout the remainder of section 2.2.5, I study the extent of contagion and thresholds
for the system-wide contagion, conditional on a general form of the joint probability
distribution for the degrees of the neighboring nodes, (k;k0). Then in section 2.3.1, I
return to the question of variations in the pattern of degree correlations and study the
eect of these variations on the spread of contagious defaults.
Generating functions
To evaluate the extent of contagion in banking networks, I use the approach based on
probability generating functions.17 First, assume that the components outgoing from
the defaulting node are tree-like in structure, that is, contain no cycles, or closed loops.18
This assumption is likely to hold if the number of nodes/banks in the nancial network,
n, is suciently large since the chances of a component containing a closed loop decrease
as n 1. The tree-like structure of the components outgoing from the defaulting node
guarantees that any bank in the system can be exposed to a default of no more than
one borrowing neighbor and no second round of contagion can occur. This implies that
safe banks, resistant to a default of a single debtor, never default. As a result, contagion
in the banking system propagates only through vulnerable banks: from one vulnerable
bank to another.
Given this feature of the model, characterizing the spread of contagious defaults in
the banking network comes to deriving the distribution of the sizes of components,
17A detailed description of the key properties of the probability generating functions can be found in
Newman et al. (2001) and Vega-Redondo (2007).
18The assumption of absent closed loops in the nancial network is supported by empirical research
which implies that clustering coecients in real-world banking networks are relatively low (for example,
Boss et al. (2004)).
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or clusters, of vulnerable banks that can be reached after an initial default. First,
consider the clusters of vulnerable banks that can be reached by following a randomly
chosen directed link, after an initial default. Let H1(yjk) be the function generating this
probability distribution conditional on the fact that a randomly chosen link via which
the vulnerable components are accessed is outgoing from the bank with in- and out-
degree k. The pattern of shock transmission can take many dierent forms. A random
link emanating from the node/bank (k;k) may lead to a component consisting of a single
bank, either safe or vulnerable, or it may lead to a vulnerable bank with one, two, or
more other tree-like vulnerable clusters emanating from it via single outgoing edges.
Clusters are reached independently for each of the outgoing edges. Then, assuming
that all clusters are almost surely of nite size, H1(yjk) must satisfy a self-consistency
condition of the form:









; k = 1;2;:::
(2.13)
where p[(j0;k0)j(k;k)] is the conditional probability that a node (j0;k0) is reached via the
outgoing link from a node (k;k). By denition, p[(k0;k0)j(k;k)] = p(k0jk), where p(k0jk)
is given by (2.11). The leading factor y in (2.13) accounts for the rst node encountered
along the initial edge and I have used the fact that a generating function of the sum of
m i.i.d. random variables is equal to the mth power of the generating function of a single
random variable. Notice that the probability of reaching a safe bank from the initial
defaulting bank (k;k), Pr[reach safe bankj(k;k)], is equal to 1 minus the probability of
the complementary event that a vulnerable bank is reached:






Using (2.14) and recalling that with probability 1 all nodes in the network have identical

















; k = 1;2;::: (2.15)
Based on functions H1(yjk), k = 1;2;:::, it is now possible to characterize the distribu-
tion of sizes of the outgoing vulnerable components reachable from a randomly selected
bank, that is, the distribution of sizes of the vulnerable components to which a randomly
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selected bank belongs. This distribution is generated by:






















k k = 1;2;:::
Two possibilities are contemplated in (2.16): either a randomly chosen bank is safe or
it is vulnerable with in- and out-degree k, k = 1;2;:::, and each of its k outgoing links
leads to a vulnerable cluster with size distribution generated by H1(yjk).
In principle, one can now solve equations (2.15) for the collection of H1(yjk), k = 1;2;:::,
and substitute into (2.16) to get H0(y). In practice, this is usually impossible: (2.15) is
a complicated and often transcendental equation, which rarely has a known solution.19
One way to tackle this problem is to nd a numerical approximation of H1(yjk) for any
k = 1;2;:::, using iterations of (2.15) with initial set of values H1 = 1. However, for
the purposes of this paper, it is enough to obtain the rst moment of the distribution of
the vulnerable cluster sizes, the expression for the average size of the vulnerable cluster.
Average size of the vulnerable component and phase transition
I now derive the expression for the average size of the vulnerable cluster in the banking
network and study the conditions for the emergence of the giant vulnerable component,
when the size of the vulnerable cluster diverges. Formally, a giant component is a unique
component whose relative size remains bounded above zero as the number of nodes in
the network increases indenitely. In the framework of this model, the formation of the
giant vulnerable cluster can be interpreted as a threshold condition for the possibility of
system-wide contagion, or "global" banking crisis: with positive probability, a random
initial default of one bank can cause failure of a substantial fraction of vulnerable insti-
tutions in the banking system. Then the relative size of the giant vulnerable component
can be regarded as a scope of the crisis should systemic failure occur.
Due to a basic property of generating functions, the average size of the vulnerable cluster,
S, can be computed as:
S = H0
0(1) (2.17)
Taking a derivative of H0















19For reference, see for example, Newman et al. (2001).
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H1(yjk) is a standard generating function so that H1(1jk) = 1 for all k. Also, kp(k) =









Dierentiating (2.15) and solving for the set of values H0
1(1jk), k = 1;2;:::, the average
size of the vulnerable cluster can be written in a form of the following matrix expression:
S = 10p + hki0M 1 (2.20)
where 1 is the vector of 1's, p = fp(k)gK
k=1 and  = f(k)gK
k=1 are the vectors of degree
frequencies for a randomly chosen and neighboring node, respectively, and M is the
matrix of elements fmk;k0gK
k;k0=1 such that
mk;k0 = k(k;k0)   (k0)k;k0; k;k0 = 1;2;::: (2.21)
Expression (2.20) diverges when det(M) = 0. This condition marks the phase transition
at which a giant vulnerable component rst appears in the network. By studying the
behavior of (2.20) close to the transition, where S must be large and positive in the
absence of a giant component, one can show that a giant vulnerable component exists
in the network when det(M) > 0.20
So, in the framework of a given model, when det(M) < 0, the vulnerable clusters in
the banking system are small and contagion stops quickly. However, if det(M)  0, a
giant vulnerable cluster arises and occupies a nite fraction of the network. The next
section presents the analytical base for computing the relative, or fractional size of the
giant vulnerable component. I employ this analysis later, in section 2.3.1, to compare
the fractional size of the giant vulnerable component across tiered and other banking
networks, so as to compare the susceptibility to risk and the scope of global crises in
various types of banking structures.
Relative size of the giant vulnerable component
When a giant vulnerable component exists in the nancial network, it is straightforward
to assess its relative size, !, { the fraction of banks in the network that belong to the
giant vulnerable component. To nd ! I rst dene 1   b !k { the probability that a
randomly selected link outgoing from a node (k;k) does not lead to the giant vulnerable
component. This means that the endnode of this randomly selected link is either a safe
bank or a vulnerable bank that does not belong to the giant vulnerable component. By
20See Newman (2002a) and Molloy and Reed (1995) for more details.
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consistency, in the latter case none of the outgoing links of the endnode bank leads to
the giant vulnerable component. This results in the following set of equations:21












1   b !k0
k0
; k = 1;2;::: (2.22)
Using the denition of p(k0jk) in (2.11), (2.22) can be written as
















1   b !k0
k0
; k = 1;2;::: (2.23)
Having obtained fb !kgK
k=1 from (2.23), let us now determine the probability ! that a
randomly selected bank belongs to the giant vulnerable component, that is, the fractional
size of the component. The probability (1   !) that a randomly selected node does not
belong to the giant vulnerable component reects the possibility of two events. First, a
randomly selected bank may be safe and hence does not span even a vulnerable singleton.
Alternatively, the bank may be vulnerable but such that none of its outgoing links leads
to the giant vulnerable component. The two possibilities sum up to:












1   b !k
k; k = 1;2;::: (2.24)
As with equations (2.15), (2.16), it is usually not possible to solve for ! in closed form,
but the approximate solution can be found by numerical iteration from a suitable set
of starting values for f1   b !kgK
k=1. Section 2.3.1 presents the results of the numerical
analysis to compare the phase transition thresholds and the sizes of the giant vulnerable
components in assortative, disassortative and neutral networks.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 The giant vulnerable component and optimal bail-out strategy
in assortative, disassortative and neutral banking networks
The numerical analysis is conducted following Newman (2002a). Let us consider the
symmetric binomial form of the joint probability distribution for the degrees of the
21The rst term in brackets on the right-hand side of (2.22) is the probability that a randomly chosen
edge emanating from a node (k;k) leads to a safe bank.
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where  +  = 1,  > 0, and N = 1
2(1   e 1=) is a normalizing constant. The choice of
this distribution function is explained by analytical tractability. Moreover, as argued by
Newman (2002a), the behavior of this distribution is also quite natural: the distribution
of the sum of the degrees, k + k0, decreases as a simple exponential, while that sum is
distributed between the two neighboring nodes binomially. The parameter  controls
the assortative, disassortative or neutral mixing in the network. From equation (2.10),
the correlation coecient of the degrees of the neighboring nodes, r, is equal to
r =
8   1
2e1=   1 + 2(   )2 (2.26)






Using the specication (2.25) of the joint degree distribution of the neighboring nodes,
and equations (2.23), (2.24), I calculate numerically the fractional size of the giant
vulnerable component, !, for  = 0:05, where the network is disassortative,  = 0:1464,
where it is neutral, and  = 0:5, where it is assortative. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the
results, showing the size of the giant vulnerable component as a function of the degree
cuto parameter K. The three panels of the gure represent cases of dierent values of
the degree scale parameter , where 1= measures the rate at which the probability of
the aggregate degree of neighboring nodes, k + k0, declines as k + k0 becomes larger.
When K increases, more and more banks in the network are characterized as vulnerable
and at some point, the giant vulnerable component is formed and a risk of global nancial
breakdown is realized. Two important outcomes are suggested by Figure 2.1. First, the
phase transition, the instance at which a giant vulnerable component arises, shifts to the
left as the network becomes more assortative. That is, the giant vulnerable component
arises more easily and the risk of "global" crisis in the banking system is higher if poorly-
connected banks preferentially associate with other poorly-connected banks. Conversely,
the disassortative/tiered banking systems show more resilience to global defaults. For
example, when  = 10 or  = 15 and 5  K  6, as it is suggested by the empirical
evidence and by the calibration results in Gai and Kapadia (2009), no risk of system-
wide contagion exists in the disassortative/tiered banking network but in the assortative
network, the risk of global default is positive. Second, for the same value of degree
cuto K, at least in the plausible range of values, the size of the giant vulnerable
component as a fraction of the whole banking network, is larger in the assortatively
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Figure 2.1: Fractional size of the giant vulnerable component as a function of K for
the joint degree distribution of the neighboring nodes given in (2.25).
mixed network. This means that as soon as contagious defaults become system-wide
(the giant vulnerable component emerges), the fraction of defaulting institutions in the
banking network, or the scope of the crisis, is larger if the network is assortative. As
a result, in the disassortative/tiered banking structure, both the risk of systemic crisis
and the scope of the crisis are lower than in the other types of structures.
These results are intuitively reasonable. In a disassortative banking network, high-degree
banks are broadly distributed over the network and therefore, presumably form links on
many paths between other banks. This implies that with high probability an initial
shock hitting a random bank reaches a high-degree bank in a small number of "steps".
Since high-degree banks are relatively resilient to neighbors' defaults, the shock gets
absorbed at that bank and does not spread any further. Therefore, both the risk of
systemic defaults and the scale of these defaults in the disassortative network are lower
than in the other structures. In fact, this simple intuition suggests that the nding
of relative resilience to shocks of disassortative networks, derived here for the specic
distribution in (2.25), can be generalized to a wider range of degree distributions, that
is, to a larger class of assortative, disassortative and neutral networks. However, the
formal investigation of this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Furthermore, the comparison of the susceptibility to crises of assortative, disassortative
and neutral banking networks allows for the evaluation of the relative eectiveness and
costs of the optimal government bail-out strategy in these networks. Here I focus on
targeted bail-outs, when the government rst rescues the defaulting institutions that
have a particularly large number of interbank connections and therefore, represent the
highest risk in terms of the spread of shocks through the network.22 Let Kmax be the
threshold degree which satises the condition that bailing-out all defaulting banks with
in- and out-degree higher than this threshold guarantees that no global crisis will emerge
(with probability 1 the giant vulnerable component will not arise). Then the banks with
in- and out-degree lower or equal to Kmax either do not default or default but do not need
to be rescued for the global stability of the system to be preserved. In this sense, Kmax
represents the highest in- and out-degree among defaulting institutions whose failure
does not endanger the stability of the banking system.
The threshold Kmax determines a priori optimal bail-out strategy of the government
in the following sense. Given only the degree distribution in the banking network, it
minimizes the number of targeted bail-outs (with in- and out-degree higher than Kmax)
subject to the constraint that the system stability is preserved. Any higher threshold
degree would not guarantee the stability of the system, whereas a lower threshold would
induce unnecessary bail-out costs.
The denition of Kmax implies that it is nothing but the point on the scale of possible
values of K at which the giant vulnerable component rst forms. It can, therefore, be
found from the conditions which determine the phase transition. Furthermore, for any
degree cuto K in the banking system, the value Kmax  K implies that no bail-outs
are required since by denition, all banks with in- and out-degree larger or equal to K
are safe. Conversely, if 1  Kmax < K, banks with degrees in the range between Kmax
and K are vulnerable and need to be rescued upon default since their failure endangers
the stability of the system.
In view of the aforesaid, Figure 2.1 suggests that in the assortative and neutral banking
networks targeted bail-outs are needed for lower values of Kmax than in the disassortative
network. For example, when  = 5, the threshold degree Kmax = 2 if the network is
assortative, 3 if it is neutral and 4 if it is disassortative. Moreover, when  = 10 or  = 50
and 5  K  6, no bail-outs are needed to preserve the stability of the disassortative
banking network, while the assortative network requires rescues of all failing banks with
in- and out-degree exceeding 2.
22Notice that in the framework of this model, bailing-out defaulting banks simply means "trans-
forming" these initially vulnerable institutions into safe institutions. After having been rescued by the
government, they become "immune" from defaults and do not transmit shocks to their neighbors in the
banking network.
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2.3.2 Resilience to systemic breakdown and targeted bail-outs in tiered
banking system: scale-free networks
Let us now consider the alternative way of representing the tiered banking network.
Suppose that there are no degree correlations between neighboring nodes but the degree
distribution is specied to capture (i) the tendency of highly-connected nodes to be
connected to poorly-connected ones and vice versa, and (ii) the numerical superiority of
the low-degree nodes over the high-degree ones. Both characteristics are inherent in the
power-law, or scale-free, degree distribution dened by:
p(k) = (   1)k ; k = 1;2;::: and 2 <  < 3 (2.27)
where, as before, p(k) is the probability that a randomly chosen node has in- and out-
degrees each equal to k,  governs the rate at which the probability decays with connec-
tivity and the assumption 2 <  < 3 means that the degree distribution is so broad that
it displays unbounded second moments but still possesses a well-dened average degree.
Arguably, it is more reasonable to think of a banking network as being generated by
the scale-free degree distribution with such low values of , since this implies that p(k)
does not decline "too fast" with k and the substantial share of banks in the network
have more than one in- and out-going connection. This assumption is supported by the
nding of Boss et al. (2004) which suggests that the power-law degree distribution of
the Austrian interbank market has exponent parameter  = 2:01.
In the framework of this model,  has an important interpretation as the inverse of a
tiering level in the scale-free network. Indeed, as the value of  declines, the fraction
of highly-connected banks in the network increases and so does the probability that
poorly-connected banks link with highly-connected ones rather than with each other.
This implies that by varying the value of , one can study and compare the risks of
systemic crisis and optimal bail-out strategy of the government in scale-free banking
networks with dierent levels of tiering. Below, I consider these questions in detail.
Specically, I nd the closed-form expression for the threshold degree Kmax and study
the functional dependence of Kmax on parameter . Hereafter, for simplicity, I regard
the degree of each node, k, as a continuous variable and the probability p(k) in (2.27)
as a continuous density function.
Generating functions
Given the assumption of absent degree correlations between neighboring nodes and the
continuous framework of the degree distribution, the generating functions H1 and H0
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where the second equality in (2.28) uses the denition of (k) in (2.7). Both expressions
can be formulated more compactly by means of the other two generating functions:
G0(y), for the number of links leaving a randomly chosen vulnerable bank, and G1(y),
for the number of links leaving a vulnerable bank reached by following a randomly
chosen incoming link. Since the degree distribution of a randomly selected bank is
given by p(k), and the degree distribution of a neighboring bank reached by following a











Functions G0(y) and G1(y) allow H0(y) and H1(y) to be rewritten in the following form:
H1(y) = (1   G1(1)) + yG1(H1(y)); (2.32)
H0(y) = (1   G0(1)) + yG0(H1(y)); (2.33)
Now, as in (2.17), the average size of the vulnerable cluster, S, can be computed as:
S = H0
0(1) = G0(H1(1)) + G0
0(H1(1))H0
1(1) = G0(1) + G0
0(1)H0
1(1) (2.34)








Hence, the average size of the vulnerable cluster becomes:






Phase transition and threshold degree Kmax
The term G0
1(1) on the right-hand side of (2.36) is the average out-degree of a vulnerable
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rst neighbor. If this quantity is less than one, all vulnerable clusters in the network
are small and contagion dies out quickly. But as G0
1(1) % 1, the average size of the
vulnerable cluster, S, increases unboundedly. It diverges when G0
1(1) = 1. It is at this
point that the giant vulnerable component, whose size scales linearly with the size of
the whole network, rst forms. The threshold degree Kmax for vulnerable banks, above
which systemic risk is realized and massive contagion is likely, can be determined from





















Since hki = ( 1)=( 2), condition G0
1(1) = 1 leads to the closed-form expression for
Kmax.
Proposition 2.1. In the scale-free network, the threshold degree Kmax at which the








Kmax is monotonically decreasing in  for all 2 <  < 3
So, the critical level for the formation of the giant vulnerable component and the targeted
bail-out strategy of the government are determined by the value of , the level of tiering
in the banking system. Furthermore, Kmax is decreasing in , that is, it is increasing in
the level of tiering.23 This functional dependence of Kmax on  is illustrated with Figure
2.2.
For  suciently close to 2, the threshold degree Kmax is large but it declines sharply
with . For example, when  is 2:1, Kmax is approximately 13 but it is only around
4 for  equal to 2:4 and around 3 for  equal to 2:7. This nding suggests that the
resilience to global crisis of the scale-free banking system with high level of tiering (
is close to 2) is very high but declines strongly when the level of tiering decreases (
becomes large). Specically, since all banks in the network with in- and out-degree
greater or equal to K are safe and K is estimated to be in the range between 5 and 6 for
real-world banking systems, no system-wide contagion occurs and hence, no bail-outs
are needed in the highly-tiered scale-free network with  close to 2.24 In contrast, for
the scale-free network with lower level of tiering, when  is around 2:4 or larger, the
23This simple comparative statics result is derived in the Appendix.
24This result agrees with the conclusion of the empirical studies by Boss et al. (2004, 2004b). For the
scale-free Austrian banking system with  = 2:01, they report that "the banking system is very stable
and default events that could be classied as a "systemic crisis" are unlikely" (Boss et al. (2004b)).
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Figure 2.2: Threshold degree Kmax as a function of .
risk of global contagion exists unless the government rescues all defaulting banks with
in- and out-degree exceeding Kmax. This means that the required bail-outs comprise all
defaulting institutions with in- and out-degree higher than 4 if  is 2:4, higher than 3 if
 is 2:7 and higher than 2 if  is arbitrarily close to 3.25
These conclusions are conrmed by Figure 2.3, which shows the threshold Kmax at
which the giant vulnerable component rst forms, and the size of the giant vulnerable
component beyond this threshold, !, for three values of .26
Intuitively, a decline in resilience of the scale-free network to shocks as the level of tiering
lowers (parameter  grows) can be explained as follows. When the level of tiering is high
( is small), the fraction of highly-connected banks in the network is relatively large and
so is the number of paths between other banks in the network which "pass" through the
25Notice, that all these values of Kmax in the scale-free network with  equal to 2:4, 2:7 and  arbitrarily
close to 3 exceed the mean degree, hki, of the scale-free distribution with the corresponding parameter
.
26The size of the giant vulnerable component is computed numerically from the equations analogous
to (2.23) and (2.24). Under the assumption of absent degree correlations and continuity of the degree
distribution, (2.23) and (2.24) become:
















1   b !
kdk; (2.39)












p(k)(1   b !)
kdk (2.40)
As before, b ! represents the fraction of links leading to the giant vulnerable component and ! is the
fraction of nodes in the giant vulnerable component.
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Figure 2.3: Fractional size of the giant vulnerable component as a function of K, for
 = 2:1,  = 2:4, and  = 2:7.
highly-connected banks. As a result, in a scale-free network with higher level of tiering,
initial shocks in any part of the network reach highly-connected banks and are absorbed
by these banks "faster" than in a less tiered network. Therefore, more tiered systems
are more resilient to massive defaults.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 shed some light on the empirical evidence about the susceptibility
of tiered banking networks to systemic shocks. They suggest that at least in the tiered
banking systems represented by the scale-free networks, the extent of resilience to shocks
is determined by the level of tiering. While a highly-tiered scale-free network is extremely
resilient to systemic defaults, less tiered structures are fragile and nancial contagion
propagates through such structures easily.
Finally, given the gap between Kmax and K, I calculate the maximal expected share of
banks, , which may need to be rescued to preserve the stability of the scale-free banking
network. This maximal expected share of rescued banks, or the upper bound for the
percentage of bail-outs in the system, corresponds to the situation when all vulnerable
banks with in- and out-degree exceeding Kmax actually default.
Proposition 2.2. In the scale-free network, the maximal expected share of banks which
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 is monotonically increasing in  for all 2 <  < 3
So, the upper bound for the percentage of bail-outs in the scale-free networks is increasing
in  for any 2 <  < 3, or equivalently, it is decreasing in the level of tiering.27
Figure 2.4: The upper bound for the percentage of bail-outs in scale-free networks as
a function of , for K = 5. Negative values of  correspond to Kmax < K.
For example, when K is 5,  is equal to 1:3% of all banks if  is 2:4, and 6:8% of all
banks if  is 2:7. Thus, the total number of bail-outs needed can be as high as 6:8% of
the system for  equal to 2:7 and at the other extreme, bail-outs may not be needed at
all if  is suciently close to 2. As before, when the system is more tiered ( is smaller),
highly connected banks form a larger fraction of the system and the number of targeted
bail-outs sucient to stop the massive contagion is smaller.
2.4 Policy implications and conclusions
This paper develops a model of contagion in a banking system and studies the eects of
tiering in the system on the risk and potential impact of system-wide defaults. High pol-
icy relevance of this issue and controversial empirical ndings provide strong motivation
for this research.
27The short proof of this result is provided in the Appendix.
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The banking system is constructed by a random directed network, where nodes repre-
sent banks and links represent claims and obligations of banks to each other. In this
framework, the tiered banking system is modelled in two ways: rst, by a disassortative
network, displaying negative degree correlations between neighboring nodes, and then
by a scale-free network. Using the rst modelling approach, I compare the resilience to
systemic defaults and optimal bail-out strategy of the government in the tiered disas-
sortative network with those in other types of networks: the assortative network, dis-
playing positive degree correlations, and the neutral network, displaying no correlations.
Subsequently, using the second approach, I concentrate on the tiered banking systems
displaying various levels of tiering. I argue that the level of tiering in the scale-free
network can be approximated by the inverse of the exponent parameter. By changing
this parameter, I evaluate the eects of the level of tiering on the susceptibility of the
banking system to shocks and on the maximal expected number of targeted bail-outs.
The key feature of the model, which highlights the importance of network structure
in determining the spread of contagious defaults, is the counteracting eects of bank
connectivity. While greater connectivity increases the spread of contagion in the banking
network, it also improves risk sharing among neighboring banks and thereby reduces
the susceptibility of banks to defaults. These opposing eects of risk sharing and risk
spreading interact dierently in varying structures. As a result, the resilience of a
banking system to shocks and the optimal number of bank rescues depend on the features
of the underlying degree distribution.
Specically, for the degree distribution which generates assortative, disassortative, and
neutral networks, I nd that the disassortative/tiered banking network is more resilient
to shocks and in the event of a crisis, shows a lower frequency of failures than other
types of structures. Consequently, the threshold degree above which the defaulting
banks endanger the stability of the system and require government assistance is higher
in the disassortative network, so that the overall number of bail-outs and the associated
bail-out costs are expected to be lower.
Further, for the scale-free banking system, I nd that the higher level of tiering implies
higher resilience to shocks and, in the worst-case scenario, lower number of bail-outs. In
particular, when the level of tiering is relatively low, the required number of bail-outs
may be as high as 6:8% of the system, whereas if the level of tiering is higher, bail-outs
may not be needed at all.
These ndings suggest not only the advantages of tiering in the banking network over
other types of network organization, but also the advantages of relatively high levels of
tiering regardless.
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These insights provide the basis for specic policy recommendations. First, the relatively
high resilience of the tiered system to contagion and the minor extent of government
intervention needed in order to reduce systemic risk imply that the formation of a more
highly tiered system of interbank relations should be among the priorities of the central
bank or the government. Secondly, the optimal level of targeted bail-outs which guar-
antees the stability of the system at minimal cost should be chosen by explicitly taking
into account the features of the underlying banking structure. Specically, if the de-
gree distribution generating the network of interbank connections is scale-free, optimal
targeted bail-outs are predetermined by the exponent parameter, or the level of tiering
in the scale-free network. The number of these bail-outs declines as the level of tiering
increases. Finally, insights about the role of bank connectivity as a shock absorber or a
shock amplier suggest that the close monitoring by the regulator is required for banks
whose connectivity is "risky": the smaller the number of incoming links (low level of risk
diversication) and the larger the number of outgoing links (high number of obligations
to other banks), the higher the potential of a bank to be a key transmitter of shocks in
the system.28
The model and results presented in this paper suggest some directions for future re-
search. An interesting extension of the paper would be to simulate the model for a large
banking system, using real balance sheets for all banks and calibrating the joint degree
distribution to match the observed data. Alternatively, one could think of endogenizing
the formation of the banking network so as to demonstrate and explain the incentives
of banks in the real world to settle within the tiered banking systems. The framework
of the network formation model could loosen the assumprions of the present setting,
allowing for distinctions in interbank asset positions of banks and for the possibility of
clusters/cycles in the banking network. In addition, to reect the dierence in conditions
for borrowing and lending in the interbank market, it could also dierentiate between
the costs of formation of incoming and outgoing links. These strands of research would
add realism to the model and provide new, potentially valuable, insights.
2.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
28If the number of incoming and outgoing links of a bank is the same, as it is assumed in the model, then
the highest risk of contagion transmission is posed by the institutions with somewhat average degree:
high-degree banks absorb shocks and therefore, are "immune" against contagion, whereas low-degree
banks may default but have only a limited scope for spreading the shock further.
Teteryatnikova, Mariya (2010), Essays on Applied Network Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13994Chapter 2. Resilience of the Interbank Network to Shocks 68
Kmax is monotonically decreasing in  as soon as its derivative with respect to  is




































 (   2)ln(   2)   (3   )
(3   )(   2)
(2.42)
Since 2 <  < 3, this derivative is negative as soon as f() =  ( 2)ln( 2) (3 ) <
0. Notice that f() is monotonically increasing in  for any 2 <  < 3. Indeed:
df()
d
=  ln(   2) > 0 82 <  < 3
Hence, for all 2 <  < 3, f() < f(3) = 0. Therefore, dKmax=d in (2.42) is strictly
negative for any 2 <  < 3.

Proof of Proposition 2.2
 is monotonically increasing in  if its derivative with respect to  is strictly positive
for all 2 <  < 3. I dierentiate with respect to  both ratios on the right-hand side
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Since 2 <  < 3 and K  1, this derivative is positive as soon as f() = 2( 2)ln( 
2) + (   1)(3   ) > 0. Notice that f() is monotonically decreasing in  for any
2 <  < 3. Indeed:
df()
d
= 2(ln(   2)    + 3) < 0 82 <  < 3
where 2(ln( 2) +3) < 0 due to the fact that 2(ln( 2) +3) is monotonically
increasing in  82 <  < 3 and its maximal value at  = 3 is equal to 0.
So, f() is decreasing in  for all 2 <  < 3. Therefore, for 2 <  < 3, f() > f(3) = 0.
This implies that d=d is strictly positive for any 2 <  < 3.





Allen F. and A. Babus (2008) "Networks in Finance," forthcoming in Network-Based
Strategies and Competencies Kleindorfer P. and J. Wind (eds.), Wharton school pub-
lishing.
Allen F. and D. Gale (2000) "Financial Contagion," Journal of Political Economy, 108:
1-33.
Acharya V. and T. Yorulmazer (2007) "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank
Bailout Policy," forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies.
Bhattachrya S. and D. Gale (1987) "Preference Shocks, Liquidity, and Central Bank
Policy," New Approaches to Monetary Economics: Proceedings of the Second Interna-
tional Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: 69-88.
Boss M., Elsinger H., Summer M., and S. Thurner (2004) "The Network Topology of the
Interbank Market," Quantitative Finance 4: 1-8.
Boss M., Elsinger H., Summer M., and S. Thurner (2004a) "An Empirical Analysis of
the Network Structure of the Austrian Interbank Market," Oesterreichische Nationalbank
Financial Stability Report, June: 77-87.
Boss M., Summer M., and S. Thurner (2004b) "Contagion Flow Through Banking Net-
work," Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3038 (eds. M. Bubak, G. D. v Albada, P.
M. A. Sloot, and J. J. Dongarra (Berlin: Springer)): 10701077
Brusco S. and F. Castiglionesi (2007) "Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Fi-
nancial Contagion," Journal of Finance, 62: 2275-2302.
Callaway D. S., Newman M. E. J., Strogatz S. H., and D. J. Watts (2000) "Network
Robustness and Fragility: Percolation on Random Graphs," Physical Review Letters,
85: 5468-5471.
Castiglionesi F. and N. Navarro (2007) "Optimal fragile nancial networks, Tilburg
University Discussion Paper 2007-100.
Cohen R., Erez K., Ben-Avraham D., and S. Havlin (2001) "Breakdown of the Internet
Under Intentional Attack," Physical Review Letters, 86: 3682-3685.
Teteryatnikova, Mariya (2010), Essays on Applied Network Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13994Degryse H. A. and G. Nguyen (2006) "Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination
of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System," Discussion Paper 2006-016, Tilburg
University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
Elsinger H., Lehar A. and M. Summer (2006) "Risk Assessment for Banking Systems,"
Management Science, 52: 1301-1314.
Flannery M. (1996) "Financial Crises, Payments System Problems and Discount Win-
dow Lending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28: 804824.
Furne C.H. (1999) "Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion," BIS
Working Paper No. 70, Basel.
Freixas X., Parigi B. and J.-C. Rochet (2000) "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and
Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32:
611-638.
Gai P. and S. Kapadia (2008) "A Network Model of Super-Systemic Crises," Bank of
England, forthcoming.
Gai P. and S. Kapadia (2009) "Contagion in Financial Networks," Bank of England,
forthcoming.
Galeotti A. and S. Goyal (2007) "A theory of strategic diusion," University of Essex
Department of Economics Discussion Paper 635.
Haldane A. G. (2009) "Rethinking the Financial Network," Bank of England, Speech
delivered at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam.
Harrison S., Lasaosa A., and M. Tudela (2005) "Tiering in UK Payment Systems-Credit
Risk Implications," Bank of England Financial Stability Review, December: 6372.
Jackson M. and L. Yariv (2007), "Diusion of behavior and equilibrium properties in
network games," American Economic Review (97): 92-98.
Leitner Y. (2005), "Financial networks: contagion, commitment and private sector
bailouts," Journal of Finance (6): 2925-53.
Mistrulli P. (2007) "Assessing Financial Contagion in the Interbank Market: Maximum
Entropy versus Observed Interbank Lending Patterns," Bank of Italy Working Paper
641.
Molloy M. and B. Reed (1995) "A Critical Point for Random Graphs With a Given
Degree Sequence," Random Structures and Algorithms, 6: 161179.
Teteryatnikova, Mariya (2010), Essays on Applied Network Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13994Morris, S (2000) "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies (67): 57-78.
Newman M. E. J., Strogatz S. H. and D. J. Watts (2001) "Random Graphs with Arbitrary
Degree Distributions and Their Applications," Physical Review E, 64, 026118.
Newman M. E. J. (2002a) "Assortative Mixing in Networks," Physical Review Letters,
89, 208701.
Newman M. E. J. (2002b) "The Spread of Epidemic Disease on Networks," Physical
Review E, 66, 016128.
Nier E., Yang J., Yorulmazer T., and A. Alentorn (2007) "Network Models and Financial
Stability," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31: 2033-2060.
Rochet J.-C. and J. Tirole (1996) "Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk," Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 28 (4): 733762.
Sheldon G. and M. Maurer (1998) "Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk: An Empirical
Analysis of Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 134 (4.2): 685704.
Strogatz S. H. (2001) "Exploring Complex Networks," Nature, 410: 268-276.
Upper C. and A. Worms (2004) "Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German In-
terbank Market: Is There a Danger of Contagion?" European Economic Review, 48:
827849.
Vega-Redondo F. (2007) "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge University Press.
Watts D. (2002) "A Simple Model of Global Cascades on Random Networks," Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99: 5766-5771.
Wells S. (2002) "UK Interbank Exposures: Systemic Risk Implications," Bank of England
Financial Stability Review, December: 175182.




The Eects of Social Networks on
Migration Decisions: Destination
Choice and Local Variations in
19th Century Italian Emigration
3.1 Introduction
One of the puzzling cases in the history of international migration is the destination
choice of Italian emigrants in the second half of the 19th century. Originally emi-
grants from Italy revealed strong preferences for countries of South America, especially
Argentina and Brazil. As emigration from Italy grew, the prominence of the United
States as a destination increased. Most of this shift occurred due to emigration from
the southern part of Italy where emigration traditions to South America were weakest.
However, despite the substantial wage gaps favoring North America over South America
and despite the higher level of urbanization in North America, urban Northern Italians
continued migrating to rural South America. Over time this resulted in an essential
dierence in Italian regional emigration; the Southern Italians migrated in large num-
bers to the United States, while the Northern Italians predominantly moved to South
America.1
This case of 19th century Italian emigration hints at the potential importance of social
connections between Italians and New World residents (natives and/or prior migrants)
1This apparent anomaly has attracted the attention of historians and migration economists. See, for
example, Baily (1983), Klein (1983), Hatton and Williamson (1998).
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in determining migration choices. In this paper I aim to shed more light on this issue.
I examine whether the puzzling lack of migration from the north of Italy to the United
States, despite the evident economic benets of that move, and simultaneous massive
migration from the south of Italy could have resulted from the initial small dierence
in the number of social contacts in the United States of the Northern and Southern
Italians. While social links between the U. S. and the north of Italy were largely absent,
the connections of the Southern Italians were formed by few pioneer migrants from the
south of Italy.
Traditional migration literature, valuable in providing insights into major determinants
of migration, lacks for an explanation of regional variations in emigration from Italy. The
key determinants of international migration suggested by this literature are dierentials
in wages and employment conditions between countries as well as migration costs ( Lewis
(1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), Sjaastad (1962), Harris and Todaro (1970), Todaro (1969,
1976, 1989), Todaro and Maruszko (1987)). These factors seem to have carried a lot of
weight in determining migration decisions of the Southern Italians. However, they were
clearly of minor importance for destination choices of the Northern Italians.
Some other studies focus specically on explaining regional dierences in emigration.
They identify local variations in degrees of economic development, urbanization and
patterns of land tenure among the main drivers of such dierences (Walker (1964),
Lowell (1987), Hatton and Williamson (1998)). However, if dierences in Italian regional
emigration had been driven by these factors, the observed patterns would have actually
been reversed: the urban Northern Italians would have favored the United States over
rural South America, while the Southern Italians would have rather migrated to South
America.
Another stream of migration literature, so-called chain migration literature, emphasizes
the positive impact of the stock of previous migrants and the lagged emigration rate on
continuation of migration (B ocker (1994), Boyd (1989), Gurak and Caces (1992), Massey
et al. (1993), Faist (2000), Dahya (1973)).2 This literature provides empirical evaluation
of migration ows, using regressions with the size of migration ow or current emigration
rate as the dependent variable and the stock of previous migrants or last-period emigra-
tion rate as an explanatory variable. The estimated positive and statistically signicant
impact of these explanatory variables is then interpreted as information provision and
assistance, especially with regard to nding work and housing, which already settled
2Hatton and Williamson (1998) report that as many as 90 percent of immigrant arrivals to the US at
the turn of the century were travelling to meet a friend or relative who had previously emigrated. Also
their estimation results suggest that for each thousand of previous emigrants a further 20 were "pulled"
abroad each year.
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migrants can pass on to new migrants.3 So, from the perspective of chain migration
studies, regional variations in Italian emigration can be explained by variations in the
stocks of previous migrants from the south and from the north of Italy. However, the
source of this variation as well as the mechanism through which the migration process
started when no stocks of migrants had yet been accumulated remain unclear.
In this paper, I extend the approach of chain migration literature so as to address the
origins of large dierences in migration to North America from the south and from the
north of Italy. Using the key insight of chain migration studies on the importance of
"friends and relatives eect" for the persistence in emigration, I do assume the existence
of initial dierence in the number of social contacts which Southern and Northern Italians
had in the U. S. However, in contrast to the research on chain migration, I assume that
this initial dierence was only marginal and that the number of social contacts itself of
either Southern or Northern Italians could be as small as 1. Moreover, in the model,
the North American acquaintances of Italians are assumed to be any North American
residents and not necessarily previous migrants from Italy.
The social connections between people are modelled with the network, where nodes rep-
resent individuals/agents and links indicate the existence of social relation between the
linked individuals. Links serve for transmission of information about job opportunities.
They predetermine employment prospects and expected earnings of each agent. Agents
are residents of either home or destination country/region. In the context of Italian
emigration, home denotes a region or a social group within a region in Italy (north or
south) and destination denotes a region in North America where some of the residents
had relation with Italians. I study the impact of a small change in the number of social
connections between the home and the destination country on migration decisions of the
home country residents, so as to infer the eects of initial variation in the number of
North American contacts of the Southern and Northern Italians on subsequent migration
ows.
Modelling job information sharing between people with a network has several advantages.
First, networks are acknowledged to be a natural representation of the interpersonal
information exchange and in particular, "one of the most extensively documented roles
for social networks in economics is that of contacts in labor markets" (Jackson (2006),
p.5). Secondly, the explicit design of the network of social relations allows for studying
3For example, Gilani et al. (1981) found in a study on Pakistan that about three-fourths of the
migrants had obtained their Middle East jobs through friends and relatives. Massey and Espinosa
(1997) in a survey of Mexican immigrants to the United States, showed that almost forty percent of
migrants received jobs through informal networks of friends. Similar results are found for immigrants
from Bangladesh and India to the Middle East (over 63 percent according to Mahmood (1991) and
Nair (1991)), from Pakistan and Cyprus to Britain (Joly (1987) and Josephides and Rex (1987)), from
Portugal to France (Hily and Poinard (1987)), and from Turkey to Germany (Wilpert (1988)).
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the mechanism through which social interaction between agents in the labor market is
transformed into migration decisions, and the impact which even a small change in the
pattern of this interaction may have on resulting migration ow. These considerations,
critical for understanding the determinants of migration decisions, have been largely
absent from the existing migration analysis.
The migration decisions of the home country residents are modelled as an outcome of
a one-shot simultaneous move game. The home country residents (players) maximize
their lifetime expected income (payo) and in the beginning of the rst time period
chose one of two strategies: either migrate to the destination country or stay at home.
To study the equilibrium of the game, I rst show that for any conguration of the
social network, there exists a unique stationary distribution of agents' employment states
in every country. Moreover, the stationary probability of employment of an agent is
increasing in the number of his/her social connections in the country. Therefore, at
least in case of a complete network, where all agents are connected with each other, the
long-run probability of employment in the home country is decreasing with migration,
whereas the probability of employment in the destination country is increasing with
migration. As a result, when agents assign substantial weight to their long-run expected
earnings, their migration decisions are strategic complements. The theory of the games in
strategic complements then suggests that there exists a unique maximal Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.4 In this paper, the result on strategic complementarity of players'
decisions and the existence of a maximal Nash equilibrium is proved analytically for
the case of a complete network structure. Then the numerical work supplements the
analysis by addressing other network topologies.
The main nding of the paper is that the marginal change in the number of social con-
nections between the home and the destination country/region may cause large variation
in agents' migration decisions. So, the substantially higher migration to North America
from the south of Italy than from the north of Italy could indeed have resulted from
minor superiority in the initial number of North American connections of Italians from
the south. Specically, for the case when the network of social relations is complete
and agents primarily care about their long-run expected income, I nd that there ex-
ists a threshold value for the number of social links to the destination country (North
America), such that no one migrates in the maximal equilibrium from a region or a
social group in the home country where the actual number of these links is below the
threshold (northern Italy), but everyone migrates from a region or a social group where
the number of these links is above the threshold (southern Italy). This conclusion is
4By denition in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004), a maximal equilibrium is such that the set
of players staying at home is maximal meaning that the set of players staying at home in any other
equilibrium of the game is a subset of those staying in at the maximal equilibrium.
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also supported by the results of numerical simulations for the case of other network
structures: the higher the number of agents' contacts in the destination country, the
higher the equilibrium migration ow, and even a marginal increase in the number of
these contacts may lead to a substantial increase in migration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model describing the economy,
evolution of employment, and migration decision game is presented in section 3.2. The
solution of the game and its dependence on the structure of links in the network are
demonstrated in section 3.3. In this section I rst describe the results of analytical work
for the case when the network is complete and agents assign a high weight to their long-
run expected earnings. Then I present the results of numerical simulations for arbitrary
network topologies. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented in section 3.4.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Economy
There are two countries/regions: the home country/region (H) and the destination
country/region (D). The economy in (H) and (D) is innite horizon in discrete time,
t 2 f1;2;:::g.
In the beginning of period 1, some residents of (H) migrate to (D). An agent in (H)
migrates to (D) as soon as his expected life-time income in (D), net of the sunk moving
cost c, is higher than his expected life-time income in (H). Having decided to migrate,
the agent leaves (H) immediately and becomes initially unemployed resident of (D). The
migration decision is made just once and no reentry is allowed for agents choosing to
migrate.5 Two ideas are implicit in these conditions. First, the majority of costs of
staying in the labor market of a particular country (education, acquiring labor market
specic skills and opportunity) are usually borne at an early stage of an agent's career
and are sunk, so that there is little incentive to change the migration decision. Secondly,
costs of moving are also sunk and usually high, which precludes from return migration.
Furthermore, all native residents of (D) stay in their country permanently; they do not
make any migration decisions.6
Let H be the set of all initial residents in (H), D be the set of all initial residents in
(D) and M be the set of migrants. Let aH = jHj, aD = jDj, and m = jMj. So,
5Similar assumptions are made for the drop-out decision game in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
6The precise description of the migration process is presented in section 3.2.5.
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after migration the total number of residents in (H) is aH   m and the total number of
residents in (D) is aD + m.
For convenience of exposition, I assume that residents of both countries are assigned a
number so that H = f1;:::;aHg and D = faH + 1;:::;aH + aDg. Besides, to address
residents of (H) and (D) after migration I dene two bijections
 : H n M ! f1;::;aH   mg,
 : D [ M ! f1;::;aD + mg,
such that  associates a certain number (i) 2 f1;::;aH   mg with each agent i who is
a permanent resident of (H) and  associates a certain number (j) 2 f1;::;aD + mg
with each agent j who is either a migrant from (H) or an initial resident of (D).
Agents in (H) and (D) are connected by the network of social relations, G. Network G
is undirected and for any i 6= j, Gij = 1 indicates that agents i and j know each other,
and Gij = 0 indicates that they do not know each other. Also, by convention, Gii = 0
for any agent i. I assume that network G is given exogenously and its structure does
not change over time.
All residents of (H) and (D) are labor market participants. Jobs within each country
are identical with the wage rate wH per period in country (H) and the wage rate wD
per period in country (D). Both wages are exogenous, constant over time and wD > wH.
Unemployed agents in each country earn nothing and receive no unemployment benets.
For any period t  1, the end-of-period t employment state of the labor market in (H)
and (D) is characterized by vectors ht and dt, respectively. If agent i from (H) (or (D))
is employed at the end of period t, ht((i)) = 1 (dt((i)) = 1), otherwise ht((i)) = 0
(dt((i)) = 0). Thus, at any t  1 ht is a 0-1 vector of length aH   m, ht 2 f0;1gaH m,
and dt is a 0-1 vector of length aD + m, dt 2 f0;1gaD+m.
Furthermore, let vectors h0, d0 characterize the initial employment state of the labor
market in (H) and (D) or equivalently, the initial distribution of employment among
agents in the two countries. Precisely, let h0 be a vector of starting employment statuses
in (H) of agents from the set H of initial (H) residents and d0 be a vector of starting
employment statuses in (D) of agents from the set D[H of initial (D) and (H) residents.
For the purposes of further analysis, the initial employment statuses in (D) of agents
from H are set to unemployment, the status which these agents would have in the
beginning of period 1 if they migrated to (D). Just like vectors ht, dt for t  1, vectors
h0, d0 are composed of 0's and 1's, where 1 indicates initial employment and 0 indicates
initial unemployment; h0 2 f0;1gaH and d0 2 f0;1gaH+aD.
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In the following, I denote by EH all initially employed and by UH a initially unemployed
in (H) agents from H. Similarly, ED denotes initially employed and UD { initially
unemployed in (D) agents from D. Formally,
EH = fi 2 H s.t. h0(i) = 1g, UH = fi 2 H s.t. h0(i) = 0g,
ED = fi 2 D s.t. d0(i) = 1g, UD = fi 2 D s.t. d0(i) = 0g.




H denote the sets of direct initially employed and unemployed
in (H) contacts of agent i from H. Likewise, Ei
D and Ui
D denote the sets of direct initially
employed and unemployed in (D) contacts of agent i from D.
Ei
H = fj 2 H s.t. Gij = 1;h0(j) = 1g, Ui
H = fj 2 H s.t. Gij = 1;h0(j) = 0g,
Ei
D = fj 2 D s.t. Gij = 1;d0(j) = 1g, Ui










Below I describe the transmission of job information and dynamics of employment in
the network. They are modelled as in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
3.2.2 Timing of events
Each period t  1 starts with some agents being employed and others unemployed as
described by the employment states ht 1, dt 1 of the previous period. If t = 1, then
in the beginning of the period agents in (H) make migration decisions and those who
decide to migrate actually leave (H) and become permanent (D) residents. After that the
timing of events in period 1 and in any period t > 1 is the following. First, residents of
both, (H) and (D) obtain information about new job openings in their own country. Any
agent in (H) and (D) hears of a new job opening directly with a probability pa 2 (0;1).
This job arrival process is independent across agents. If the agent is unemployed, he
accepts the job oer. If the agent is already employed, he passes the oer along to one of
the direct unemployed contacts in the same country. This is where the network structure
of relationships between people becomes important: it determines the job information
exchange process and ultimately aects long-run employment prospects of any agent.
Finally, the last event that happens in a period is that some employed agents lose
their jobs. This happens randomly with a breakup probability pb 2 (0;1) which is also
independent across all agents in (H) and (D).
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3.2.3 Job information exchange
I impose four important assumptions on the job information exchange between agents.
First, the job information is transmitted in at most one stage7: if the job oer is neither
taken by the agent who hears of the job directly nor by the direct contacts of this agent,
the job is wasted rather than being passed on to some other needy party. Secondly,
if several job oers arrive to one unemployed agent, he randomly selects only one of
them and all other job oers remain unlled.8 Thirdly, an employed agent passes the
job information to one of his direct unemployed contacts with uniform randomization.9
Finally, after migration the information may only ow between agents within the same
country.
The last assumption means that after migration taking place in the beginning of the
rst period, links connecting an agent from (H) with agents in (D) are only "active" if
the agent from (H) has migrated to (D). At the same time, links connecting a migrant
with his friends in (H) "stop functioning". This assumption can be justied as follows.
Since migration decisions are irreversible, sending job information to agents in the other
country after migration has taken place is essentially vain and job oers are doomed to
be wasted. Indeed, agents in (D), either initial (D) residents or newcomers, cannot take
on a job in (H) as they stay in (D) forever. Similarly, agents in (H) who decided to stay
cannot take on a job in (D). Therefore, in this model, only job information exchanged
between residents of the same country can be used to eectively result in employment.
Notice that such specication of the model suggests that although migration does not
change the structure of the whole network G, it actually alters the structure of the
labor market in (H) and in (D). In particular, when someone migrates, she/he is de
facto removed from the set of agents in (H) and cannot share job information with
agents who stayed in (H). This aspect of the model is of essential dierence from the
specication of the drop-out decision game in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004). In
their model, the network structure of the labor market is not altered when an agent
drops out; instead the dropout's employment status is set to be zero forever but her/his
social contacts continue to pass on information about jobs.
Lastly, this dierence in information transmission via links connecting residents of the
same country and links connecting residents of dierent countries plays a major role in
7The terminology of Boorman (1975).
8The rst two assumptions rule out the study of chain eects in the transmission of job information.
However, the one-stage information transmission is strongly supported by the empirical study in Gra-
novetter (1974). The nding of the study is that information chains of length two or more account for
only 15.6 percent of the sample.
9This is the so-called equal neighbors treatment assumption in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
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separating labor markets of (H) and (D). In particular, it predetermines irrelevance of
the employment status and network structure in one market to employment conditions
in the other market.
3.2.4 Transition between employment states
The evolution of employment of any agent i over time is predetermined by the sequence
of stochastic events in each time period. For example, the transition from unemployment
at the end of period t   1 to employment at the end of period t is possible if agent i
either receives a job oer directly, at rate pa, or hears about a job oer from one of
his direct employed contacts. The chance to hear about a job oer from an employed
friend is increasing in probability pa that this friend will receive an extra job oer but
is decreasing in the number of other unemployed contacts of this friend. Moreover,
having received a job, the agent can only keep it till the end of a period with probability
1   pb. Somewhat simpler, the transition from employment at the end of period t   1
to unemployment at the end of period t is fully determined by the breakup rate, pb,
and does not depend on the pattern of social connections of an agent. The other two
transitions, when the employment status of an agent does not change over the period, are
dened by the corresponding complementary events. Formally, for any agent i 2 H nM
and for any t  2, the four probabilities of transition between employment states are
given by:
P(ht((i)) = 1jht 1((i)) = 0) =
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1   pb)
2













(1   pb)pa if Ei
HnM;t 1 = ;
=
= (1   pb)
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P(ht((i)) = 0jht 1((i)) = 0) = 1   P(ht((i)) = 1jht 1((i)) = 0) (3.2)
P(ht((i)) = 0jht 1((i)) = 1) = pb (3.3)
P(ht((i)) = 1jht 1((i)) = 1) = 1   P(ht((i)) = 0jht 1((i)) = 1) = 1   pb (3.4)
where Ei
HnM;t 1 is the set of direct contacts of agent i in H n M who are employed
in (H) at the end of period t   1, U
j
HnM;t 1 is the set of direct contacts of agent j
(j 2 Ei
HnM;t 1) in H n M who are unemployed in (H) at the end of period t   1, and
1Ei
HnM;t 1 = 1 if Ei
HnM;t 1 6= ; but 1Ei
HnM;t 1 = 0 otherwise.
Teteryatnikova, Mariya (2010), Essays on Applied Network Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13994Chapter 3. The Eects of Social Networks on Migration Decisions 82
Similarly, for any agent i 2 D[M and any t  2, the probabilities of transition between
employment states are dened by four equations:
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P(dt((i)) = 0jdt 1((i)) = 0) = 1   P(dt((i)) = 1jdt 1((i)) = 0) (3.6)
P(dt((i)) = 0jdt 1((i)) = 1) = pb (3.7)
P(dt((i)) = 1jdt 1((i)) = 1) = 1   P(dt((i)) = 0jdt 1((i)) = 1) = 1   pb (3.8)
where Ei
D[M;t 1 is the set of direct contacts of agent i in D [ M who are employed
in (D) at the end of period t   1, U
j
D[M;t 1 is the set of direct contacts of agent j
(j 2 Ei
D[M;t 1) in D [ M who are unemployed in (D) at the end of period t   1, and
1Ei
D[M;t 1 = 1 if Ei
D[M;t 1 6= ; but 1Ei
D[M;t 1 = 0 otherwise.
Notice that essentially the same equations determine the probabilities of transition from
the initial employment status to the employment status at the end of period 1 in both
countries. The equations should only be corrected for the fact that the initial employ-
ment status of any agent i 2 H nM is given by h0(i) and the initial employment status
of i 2 D [ M is given by d0(i).
Remark Time t employment status of any agent i in a given country is fully determined
by the job arrival and breakup rates, pa and pb, by the network structure and the time
t   1 employment status of agents in a two-links-away neighborhood of agent i in that
country. The probability of being employed at period t for agent i who is unemployed
at the end of period t   1 is increasing in the number of direct employed contacts and
decreasing in the number of two-links-away unemployed contacts who share at least one
of their direct employed contacts with i.
The Remark suggests that in a one-period-ahead perspective, direct employed contacts of
unemployed agent i improve his prospects for hearing about a job oer while unemployed
two-links-away contacts are agent i's "competitors" for job information and therefore,
decrease his chances of employment. More distant indirect relationships do not have
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an impact on one-period-ahead employment prospects of i. However, in a longer time
frame, the larger network and status of other agents aect employment status of agent
i through the eect they have on the employment status of i's connections.
Given transition probabilities between employment states of any agent in (H) and in (D),
transition probability between two employment states of the whole labor market in each
country is simply a product of the transition probabilities between the corresponding
employment states of agents. So, for any two employment states h, h0 in (H) and d, d0
in (D) and for any t  2,
P(ht = h0jht 1 = h) =
Y
i2HnM
P(ht((i)) = h0((i))jht 1((i)) = h((i))) (3.9)
P(dt = d0jdt 1 = d) =
Y
i2D[M
P(dt((i)) = d0((i))jdt 1((i)) = d((i))) (3.10)
The Remark, (3.9) and (3.10) imply that employment state ht of the labor market in
(H) and employment state dt of the labor market in (D) follow two separate nite state
Markov processes. I denote by M(G[H n M];pa;pb) the Markov process for ht and by
M(G[D [ M];pa;pb) the Markov process for dt.10
Markov processes M(G[H nM];pa;pb) and M(G[D[M];pa;pb) have several important
characteristics. First, they are both homogenous. This follows from the fact that job
arrival and breakup probabilities, pa and pb, are constant and the structure of the net-
work in (H) and (D) does not change after migration taking place in the very beginning
of period 1. Secondly, Markov chains for ht and dt are irreducible and aperiodic, since
all transition probabilities are strictly positive.
These properties of Markov chains M(G[H n M];pa;pb) and M(G[D [ M];pa;pb) lead
to the following statement:
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique stationary distribution of employment states
in (H) and a unique stationary distribution of employment states in (D).
The stationary distribution of employment in (H) and (D) denes a unique steady-state










(d) 8 i 2 D [ M (3.12)
10G[A] denotes the network induced by graph G on the set of agents A.
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where  is the stationary distribution of employment states in (H) and  is the stationary
distribution of employment states in (D).
3.2.5 Migration decision game
Description of the game Migration decision making of residents in (H) is modelled
as a one-shot simultaneous move game,  , where the structure of the game is common
knowledge. The game takes place in the beginning of period 1 when no information
about new job openings has yet arrived in either of the two countries. The players are
all residents of (H). They simultaneously choose one of two actions: staying in (H),
denoted by s, or migrating to (D), denoted by m, so as to maximize their expected
life-time income. In the strategic form,   = [H;;figi2H], where H is a set of players,
 = fs;mg is each player's set of pure strategies, and i is a payo function of player i,
the expected income of i in (H) or (D).
Strategies and payo function Let  = ((1);:::;(aH)) be a prole of pure strategies
of all players in H and ( i) be a prole of pure strategies of player i's opponents. Let
vi
H(( i)) and vi
D(( i)) represent the expected life-time income of player i in (H)
and (D), provided that i's opponents play ( i). Then for each player i 2 H and any





To write functions vi
H and vi
D explicitly, I impose an important simplifying assumption.
For the rest of the paper I assume that agents in both countries start in period 1, and
then jump to the steady state in the next "period".11 This gives a rough representation
of the life-time optimization problem of players, but enough to see the eects of their
interaction in the short and in the long run.
Under this assumption, the expected life-time income of player i in either country is
the sum of the expected income in period 1 and the present discounted value of the
future expected income starting from period 2 onwards. The future expected income is
represented by the innite ow of the identical one-period expected earnings determined
by the product of the steady-state probability of employment and constant wage rate.
11The same simplication is made in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) for their study of the drop-
out decision game.
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ss(( i)) if h0(i) = 0
(3.13)
where pi and pi
ss are the probabilities of player i to be employed in (H) at the beginning
of period 1 (if i is initially unemployed) and at the steady-state,12 and 0 <  < 1 is a
constant discount factor.











Likewise, if player i moves to (D), he receives a payo
vi
D(( i)) = wDqi(( i))   c + wDqi
ss(( i)) + 2wDqi
ss(( i)) +  =





where qi and qi
ss are the probabilities of player i to be employed in (D) at the beginning
of period 1 and at the steady-state.13
Notice that probabilities pi and qi, in the above equations, dier from the probabilities
of transition between initial unemployment and end-of-period-1 employment as dened
in section 3.2.4. In fact, pi and qi are higher than the corresponding transition proba-
bilities, since they describe the chance of getting employed in the beginning of a period
irrespective of the fact that the job can be lost in the end of the period:
pi =




P(d1((i)) = 1jd0(i) = 0)
1   pb
(3.17)
Equilibrium The equilibrium of game   is a standard Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. Below I study the properties of this equilibrium in order to infer how migration
decisions of individuals are aected by the structure of their social relations and in
particular, by the number of their contacts in the destination country.





were dened in (3.11) and (3.12).
13Due to the assumption that any migrant is initially unemployed in (D), v
i
D represents the expected
life-time income of initially unemployed agent in (D).
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3.3 Results
First, I consider the specic case when network G of social connections is complete (or
represents a union of complete components), so that all individuals in the network are
linked with each other. Furthermore, I assume that discount factor  is suciently
close to 1, that is, agents mainly care about their expected earnings in the long run. In
fact, when  is suciently "large", the weight

1  assigned by agents to their expected
earnings from period 2 onwards is substantially larger than the weight assigned to their
expected income in period 1. As a result, migration decisions of home country residents
are essentially driven by their long-run income considerations.
For this admittedly restrictive setting I solve the model analytically. I prove the exis-
tence of equilibrium and study the change in the equilibrium migration choices as the
number of links to the destination country changes just marginally. After that I relax
the assumptions on the network structure and the discount parameter and examine the
outcomes of the migration decision game in some simple numerical examples.
3.3.1 Steady-state probability of employment and maximal Nash equi-
librium in the complete network
The long-run expected income in (H) and in (D), which determines migration choices of
players when  is large enough, hinges on the steady-state probability of employment.
Below I consider the dependence of the steady-state probability of employment in the
complete network on the total number of agents, or alternatively, on the number of
direct social contacts of each agent.14
The steady-state probability of employment can be derived using the subdivision of
periods procedure proposed in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004). The idea of this
procedure is that as we divide job arrival rate, pa, and job breakup rate, pb, by some
larger and larger factor, we are essentially looking at arbitrarily short time periods.
Then one can begin to dierentiate between the short- and long-run eects.15;16
14Clearly, since the network is complete, the steady-state probability of employment is fully dened
by the total number of agents in the network.
15In the limit, the resulting process for employment approaches a continuous time (Poisson) process,
which is a natural situation where the short-run eects of agents' interaction are inconsequential and
employment prospects of any individual are determined by the long-run eects.





T ) for the employment state on a complete network g. In terminology of Calv o-Armengol and
Jackson (2004), this Markov process is called the T-period subdivision of Markov process M(g;pa;pb).
Lemma 3.2 addresses the situation when T is suciently large, so that the true steady-state probability




T ) can be calculated using the approximate Markov
process. Further details are provided in the Appendix.
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Lemma 3.2. Under ne enough subdivision of periods, the steady-state probability of




























It is strictly increasing in n.
The statement of Lemma 3.2 is illustrated with Figure 3.1. The strictly monotonic
pattern of the steady-state probability is preserved for all combinations of parameters
pa, pb; higher pa and lower pb result in better employment prospects in the long run.
Figure 3.1: Steady-state probability of employment in the complete network of size
n.
Thus, despite the short-run competition for jobs between unemployed agents,17 in the
long run, having more agents in the network is good news for everyone as it eectively
improves future employment prospects of any agent. In particular, this implies that
in the complete network, migration has a long-lasting positive eect on employment
probability in (D) but is also detrimental for the long-run employment probability in
(H).18 As a consequence, if the weight assigned to the long-run expected income is
high enough, i.e.  is suciently close to 1, the incentive of any agent to migrate is
increasing as more of the other players migrate. Likewise, the greater the number of
players who stay, the stronger the incentive for others to stay. This inference gives rise
to Proposition 3.3.
17See the Remark in section 3.2.4.
18This result supports the idea that migrants can promote the welfare of the destination country.
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Proposition 3.3. Given complete network G and ne enough subdivision of periods,
there exists   such that for all    :
1. Decisions of players in H are strategic complements, that is, game   is supermod-
ular
2. There exists a unique maximal Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
The existence of a maximal Nash equilibrium follows from the theory of supermodular
games. The maximal equilibrium is dened as in Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
It is an equilibrium where the set of players staying in (H) is maximal, that is, the set of
players staying in (H) at any other equilibrium of the game is a subset of those staying
in (H) at the maximal equilibrium.
3.3.2 The eects of links between countries on equilibrium migration
ow
Strategic complementarity of players' decisions and interchangeability of players' posi-
tions in the complete network imply that only four outcomes are possible at equilibrium:
initially unemployed players either all migrate or all stay and initially employed players
either all migrate or all stay. Moreover, since irrespectively of players' initial employ-
ment status, expected earnings in period 1 are negligible compared to those from period
2 onwards ( is close to 1), not only the strategies of players with identical initial status
are the same but the strategies of all players are the same. This leads to Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4. Given complete network G and ne enough subdivision of periods,
either no one or everyone migrates at the maximal Nash equilibrium. The situation
when no one migrates is the maximal Nash equilibrium if and only if
wH(aH)  wD(aD + 1): (3.19)
Condition (3.19) states that for any agent, the steady-state expected income in (H) is at
least as high as in (D), provided that all other players stay. Thus, the situation when no
one migrates is sustainable at the Nash equilibrium.19 Furthermore, the situation when
everyone migrates is always a Nash equilibrium (although not necessarily maximal),
since for any wD > wH,
wH(aH) < wD(aD + aH)
19Recall that when  is high enough, it is the long-run expected income in (H) and in (D) that
determines equilibrium decisions of players.
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It is easy to see that the larger the number aD of players' contacts in D, the more
likely it is that in the maximal equilibrium, all players migrate. Formally, given aH, wH
and wD, there exists a threshold value  aD(aH;wH;wD) of aD such that as soon as aD
exceeds this threshold, the inequality wH(aH)  wD(aD + 1) does not hold and the
outcome with all players staying in (H) is not an equilibrium. Therefore, as a corollary
of Proposition 3.4, we obtain:
Proposition 3.5. The number of migrants in the maximal equilibrium of   is not de-
creasing in the number of players' contacts in D. Moreover, for any aH, wH and wD,
there exists a threshold value  aD(aH;wH;wD) such that no one migrates in the maximal
Nash equilibrium when the number of players' contacts in D is equal to  aD(aH;wH;wD),
but everyone migrates if this number of contacts exceeds  aD(aH;wH;wD) at least by 1.
The threshold  aD(aH;wH;wD) is dened by the equation:
wH
wD
(aH) = (aD + 1) (3.20)
Thus, under certain conditions on the network structure and on the ratio of wages in
(H) and in (D), just a minor increase in the number of social connections with (D) leads
to a sharp increase in migration at the maximal Nash equilibrium.
The result of Proposition 3.5 is certainly very stylized. However, it still demonstrates
the desired eects. In particular, for the case of 19th century Italian emigration, it
suggests that the striking dierence in migration ows to North America from the south
and from the north of Italy could have resulted from a small initial dierence in the
number of social links to North America from each of the two regions.20
More formally, suppose that HN and HS are two social groups in the south and in
the north of Italy respectively and that DN and DS are two groups in North America,
such that DN has social connections with HN and DS has social connections with
HS. Suppose that communities in the south and in the north of Italy are "separated",
so that they do not have an impact on the long-run expected earnings of each other.
For example, let G[HN], G[HS] form separate components of the network in Italy and
G[DN], G[DS] form separate components of the network in North America. Also, let
both G[HN [ DN] and G[HS [ DS] be complete networks and jHNj = jHSj = aH.
Furthermore, assume that jDSj >  aD(aH;wH;wD)  jDNj, that is, the number of North
American contacts of the Southern Italians is larger than the threshold  aD(aH;wH;wD)
dened above and the number of North American contacts of the Northern Italians is
lower or equal to this threshold. Then according to Proposition 3.5, in the maximal
20Moreover, the preceding analysis suggests that if Italian potential migrants were mainly concerned
about their earnings in the long run, the gap in initial employment conditions favoring North America
over Italy did not play a major role in determining the migration decisions.
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Nash equilibrium of the migration decision game, everyone migrates from the group HS
of Southern Italians but no one migrates from the group HN of the Northern Italians,
provided that both, Northern and Southern Italians mainly care about their expected
income in the long run.
For example, for the specic parameter values, pa = pb = 0:05, aH = 10 and wH
wD 2
[0:6366;0:7639), condition (3.19) suggests that in the maximal Nash equilibrium, no one
migrates from HN, if agents in HN do not have any social connections in North America
(jDNj = 0), but everyone migrates from HS, if agents in HS have just one acquaintance
in North America (jDSj = 1).21
3.3.3 The eects of links between countries on migration in non-complete
networks: Numerical exercise
In this section I relax the assumptions that network G is complete and discount factor 
is close to 1. I show that the basic insights from the previous analysis about the impact
of social links between agents on the steady-state probability of employment and on the
size of migration ow continue to hold.
First, just as in case of a complete network structure, I nd that the steady-state proba-
bility of employment of any agent in a non-complete network is increasing in the number
of the agent's direct contacts. This result is demonstrated by examples in Table 3.1. Ta-
ble 3.1 displays the values of the steady-state probability of employment of agent 1. As
the number of connections between agent 1 and other agents increases, the steady-state
probability of employment grows.22 Moreover, everything else being equal, higher job
information arrival rate, pa, and lower job breakup rate, pb, result in higher probability
of employment in the long run.
As before, the nding of a positive impact of direct social contacts on each agent's
steady-state probability of employment suggests that as soon as discount factor  is
high enough, directly linked players tend to choose identical strategies. However, strate-
gic complementarity of all players' decisions and the existence of a (maximal) Nash
equilibrium in the game are contingent on the particularity of the network structure and
chosen parameter values.
21This result is implied by inequality
wD(1)  wH(aH) < wD(2)
where (1)  0:5, (2)  0:6, and (aH) = (10)  0:7854 according to Figure 3.1 (see the plot
corresponding to pa = pb = 0:05).
22The upper part of Table 3.1 displays the change in the steady-state probability of employment of
agent 1 when the number of his links with other agents increases but the size of the network remains
xed; the lower part of the table continues the exercise for the case when an increase in the number of
links of agent 1 comes along with an increase in the size of the network.
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Table 3.1: Steady-state probability of employment of agent 1 for dierent values of
pa and pb
network G pa = 0:2 pa = 0:1 pa = 0:1 pa = 0:05
(size of G is xed) pb = 0:015 pb = 0:015 pb = 0:03 pb = 0:05
0.9292 0.8678 0.7638 0.4872
0.9583 0.9219 0.8463 0.5748
0.9686 0.9426 0.8818 0.6269
0.9770 0.9608 0.9163 0.6971
network G pa = 0:2 pa = 0:1 pa = 0:1 pa = 0:05
(size of G changes) pb = 0:015 pb = 0:015 pb = 0:03 pb = 0:05
0.9584 0.9221 0.8469 0.5760
0.9686 0.9425 0.8818 0.6294
0.9740 0.9544 0.9052 0.6800
0.9772 0.9616 0.9196 0.7154
Remark: The probabilities are expressed in percentage points.
If Nash equilibrium exists, it can be dened by simple conditions. To state these con-
ditions formally for a generic network structure and any 0 <  < 1, I introduce new
notation. Let Ci
H, Ci
D be the sets of those players in H who are competitors or potential
competitors of player i for the rst-period job oers in (H) and in (D), respectively:





H;from j; where Ci
H;from j =
n









D;from j; where Ci
D;from j =
n
l 2 H s.t. l 6= i;j 2 El
D
o
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If player i is initially employed in (H), I assume that the set of his competitors in (H) is
empty:
8i 2 EH Ci
H = ;
Using this notation, an equilibrium of game   can be dened as a strategy prole such
that for any player i who migrates, i 2 M, the following inequality holds:
wH












































H;from j = jCi
H;from j \ Mj, ci
D;from j = jCi
D;from j \ Mj, and pi
ss, qi
ss are the steady-
state probabilities of employment of player i on G[fHnMg [ fig] and G[D [ M],
respectively. At the same time, for any player k who does not migrate, k 2 HnM, the
opposite inequality or equality holds.
I use this denition of equilibrium in order to nd equilibrium of the game numerically
for a range of network structures and particular parameter values. I focus on a change
in equilibrium strategies of players caused by a single link increase in the number of
connections between (H) and (D).
Table 3.2 presents the results for four specic examples. The values of parameters used
to calculate these examples are wH = 5, wD = 7, c = 1, pa = 0:1, pb = 0:015, and
 = 0:7.23 For these parametric assumptions and for a large set of combinations of
initial employment states in (H) and (D), I nd that there exists a unique maximal Nash
equilibrium of the migration decision game in each of the four examples. Moreover, for
a subset of initial employment states in two countries, a minimal increase in the number
of social links between (H) and (D) causes a substantial increase in the amount of agents
who choose to migrate at the maximal equilibrium. For example, for some employment
conditions, not only the agent whose own number of links increases changes his strategy
in favor of migrating but also some other agents in (H) do so.24
23The same values of pa and pb are used in the numerical examples of Calv o-Armengol and Jackson
(2004). The authors argue that "if we think about these numbers from the perspective of a time period
being a week, then an agent looses a job roughly on average once in 67 weeks, and hears (directly) about
a job on average once in every 10 weeks" (p. 430).
24See examples 1, 3, and 4 of Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Equilibrium strategy proles of players in H. Changes caused by adding
a link
Example 1: H = f1;2;3g, D = f4;5;6g, link 2   4 is added
Initial employment states in H and D
h0 = (0;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (m;s;s) (m;m;s)
h0 = (0;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (m;s;s) (m;m;s)
h0 = (1;1;0);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;m) (m;m;m)
h0 = (1;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;s;s) (m;m;s)
h0 = (1;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;s) (m;m;s)
Example 2: H = f1;2;3;4g, D = f5;6;7g, link 2   6 is added
Initial employment states in H and D
h0 = (0;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (m;s;m;s) (m;m;m;s)
h0 = (0;1;1;0);d0jD = (1;1;0) (m;s;s;m) (m;m;s;m)
h0 = (0;1;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (m;s;s;s) (m;m;s;s)
h0 = (1;1;0;0);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;s;m;m) (s;m;m;m)
h0 = (1;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;s;m;s) (s;m;m;s)
h0 = (1;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;m;s) (s;m;m;s)
h0 = (1;1;1;0);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;s;s;m) (s;m;s;m)
Example 3: H = f1;2;3;4;5g, D = f6;7;8g, link 1   6 is added
Initial employment states in H and D
h0 = (1;0;0;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;m;m;m;s) (m;m;m;m;m)
h0 = (1;0;0;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;m;m;m;s) (m;m;m;m;m)
h0 = (1;0;0;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;m;m;s;s) (m;m;m;s;s)
h0 = (1;0;0;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;m;m;s;s) (m;m;m;s;s)
h0 = (1;0;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;m;s;m;s) (m;m;s;m;m)
h0 = (1;0;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;m;s;m;s) (m;m;s;m;m)
h0 = (1;0;1;1;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;m;s;s;s) (m;m;s;s;s)
h0 = (1;1;0;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;s;m;m;s) (m;s;m;m;m)
h0 = (1;1;0;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;m;m;s) (m;s;m;m;m)
h0 = (1;1;1;0;0);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;s;m;m) (m;s;s;m;m)
h0 = (1;1;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;0) (s;s;s;m;s) (m;s;s;m;m)
h0 = (1;1;1;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;s;m;s) (m;s;s;m;m)
Example 4: H = f1;2;3;4;5;6g, D = f7;8;9g, link 3   8 is added
Initial employment states in H and D
h0 = (0;1;1;0;0;1);d0jD = (0;1;1) (m;s;s;m;m;s) (m;s;m;m;m;s)
h0 = (0;1;1;0;0;1);d0jD = (1;1;1) (m;s;s;m;m;s) (m;s;m;m;m;s)
h0 = (0;1;0;0;1;0);d0jD = (1;1;1) (s;s;s;m;m;m) (m;m;m;m;m;m)
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Examples of Table 3.2 can be viewed as an illustration of Italian emigration case. Indeed,
let H represents a group of people in the north of Italy and D represents a group in
North America. Suppose that a group of people in the south of Italy has the same
structure of social relations with each other and the same initial employment state as a
group of people in the north of Italy, H. Then the examples of Table 3.2 suggests that
for a certain combination of initial employment states of Italians and North Americans, a
substantially higher proportion of Southern Italians migrates to North America as soon
as the number of social connections between the Southern Italians and North Americans
is just marginally higher than the number of connections between the Northern Italians
and North Americans.
3.4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the puzzling lack of migration from the
north of Italy to North America, despite the evident economic benets of that move, and
simultaneous large migration from the south of Italy could have resulted from the initial
small dierence in the number of social contacts in North America of the Northern
and Southern Italians. By studying the origins of variation in migration, I intend to
contribute to the research on chain migration which concentrates on explaining the
continuation of migration, provided that substantial amount of people have migrated
previously.
To address the case of Italian emigration, I consider an explicit network model with two
countries, a home and a destination country, and study the eects of a small variation
in the number of social links between these countries on the size of the migration ow.
Agents in the network are labor market participants. They use their links with direct
contacts to exchange information about job opportunities in the local labor market.
Employment of every agent in each time period is subject to the idiosyncratic risk. If an
agent is unemployed, then having links to employed agents improves his prospects for
hearing about a job oer. In contrast, having two-links-away unemployed competitors
for job information worsens these prospects. In the beginning of period 1, residents of
the home country compare their employment prospects at home and in the destination
country and take once-and-for-all migration decisions. These migration decisions are
modelled as a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a one-shot simultaneous move game. I
study the properties of this equilibrium.
The analytical work in the paper is restricted to the case when the network of social
connections is complete and discount factor  is suciently close to 1. I nd that in
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such a setting, the steady-state probability of employment of any agent is increasing in
the size of the network. This implies that migration improves the long-run employment
prospects in the destination country but worsens those in the home country. As a result,
migration decisions of the home country residents turn out to be strategic complements
which guarantees the existence of a unique maximal Nash equilibrium in the game.
The main nding of the paper is that substantially higher migration to North America
from the south than from the north of Italy could indeed be an outcome of originally
minor superiority in the number of social links with North America of the Southern
Italians over those of the Northern Italians. In particular, in the stylized setting of the
model, when the network of social connections is complete and  is close to 1, there
exists a threshold value for a number of links to North America, such that as soon as
the actual number of links to North America of a group of the Northern Italians is lower
than this threshold and the actual number of such links of a group of the Southern
Italians is higher than this threshold, no one migrates from the group of the Northern
Italians but everyone migrates from the group of the Southern Italians at the maximal
Nash equilibrium.
More generally, numerical simulations for various network structures show that higher
number of social connections between countries leads to higher migration ow. Moreover,
even a small increase in the number of these connections may produce a large increase in
migration, at least as soon as certain conditions on the network structure and/or initial
employment states in the two countries are fullled.
The results of the paper demonstrate the importance of the structure of social relations
in determining migration decisions and emphasize the role of initial connections between
North Americans and Italians in explaining the subsequent variation in emigration from
the north and from the south of Italy.
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3.5 Appendix
To calculate the steady-state probability of employment, I analyze the subdivided dy-





T ) of the Markov process M(g;pa;pb) for the arbitrary
network structure g. Let PT denote the matrix of transitions between dierent em-
ployment states under MT. That is, PT
ss0 is the probability that st = s0 conditional on




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
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T + o( 1
T2) if s and s0 are adjacent and s(i) > s0(i) for some i
pi(s)
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T2) if s and s0 are adjacent and s(i) < s0(i) for some i
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T2) if s = s0




pi(s) is the probability that agent i who is unemployed in state s hears about a new job
oer and at most ones:
pi(s) = pa + pa 
X






The denition of PT




T ) is a Poisson process.
In particular, when T is high enough, the probability of even a single shock to employ-
ment state, s, at every subperiod is very low (of order 1
T ). The probability of two or
more shocks is even lower (of order 1









T ) where only one-shock transitions
are retained while the transitions involving two or more shocks are disregarded. Matrix




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
pb
T if s and s0 are adjacent and s(i) > s0(i) for some i
pi(s)
T if s and s0 are adjacent and s(i) < s0(i) for some i







T if s = s0
(3.21)
In the following, I calculate the stationary probability distribution of employment using
the approximate Markov process, c MT, instead of Markov process MT. This substitution
is justied since for large enough values of T, transition probabilities of the approximate
Markov process, c MT, are close to those of the true Markov process, MT. As a result,
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the stationary probability distributions under MT and under c MT are also close, which






where T is the steady-state distribution of employment under MT and ^ T is the steady-
state distribution of employment under c MT.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
To simplify the notation, below I use a for
pa
T and b for
pb
T .
The steady-state probability of employment of any agent i in the complete network of











^ T(s : #s = k); (3.22)
where ^ T(s : #s = k) is the steady-state probability of employment state s, such that
exactly k agents are employed. To derive ^ T(s : #s = k) for any k 2 0 : n I use the
denition of transition probabilities, b PT





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
b if s and s0 are adjacent and s(i) > s0(i) for some i
a(1 +
#s
n #s) if s and s0 are adjacent and s(i) < s0(i) for some i
0 if s and s0 are non-adjacent and s 6= s0
1   #sb   an1f#sn 1g if s = s0
(3.23)
(3.23) enables representation of ^ T in the following form:




n   k + 1

^ T(s : s( i) = s0( i) and s(i) < s0(i)1fk1g) +
+ b(n   k)^ T(s : s( i) = s0( i) and s(i) > s0(i)1fkn 1g) +
+ (1   bk   an1fkn 1g)^ T(s0 : #s0 = k); k 2 0 : n (3.24)
The rst term in the sum on the right-hand side of (3.24) corresponds to a change in the
employment status of agent i from unemployment in s, s(i) = 0, to employment in s0,
s0(i) = 1. There are k such agents and each of them may nd a job either directly, with
probability a, or using the information about a job oer from one of his k  1 employed
25The derivation of the expression for ^ 
T in this proof is based on the unpublished manuscript by A.
Calv o-Armengol (2007).
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friends, with probability a k 1
n k+1, since every friend chooses i as a job oer recipient
randomly among n   k + 1 unemployed candidates.
The second term on the right-hand side of (3.24) corresponds to a change in the employ-
ment status of agent i from employment in s to unemployment in s0. There are n   k
such agents and each of them looses a job at exogenous rate b.
Finally, the third term in the sum corresponds to the case when none of the agents
changes his employment status.
Cancelling the term ^ T(s0 : #s = k) on the left- and on the right-hand side of (3.24)
results in the system of equations (3.25):





n   k + 1

^ T(s : s( i) = s0( i) and s(i) < s0(i))
+ b(n   k)^ T(s : s( i) = s0( i) and s(i) > s0(i)); k 2 0 : n(3.25)
To solve this system, I rst rewrite it in terms of probabilities k, k 2 0 : n, that k out







^ T(s : #s = k); k 2 0 : n (3.26)
Then (3.25) reduces to a system of n + 1 equations with n + 1 unknowns, 0;:::;n:
(an1fkn 1g + bk)k = 1fk1gank 1 + 1fkn 1gb(k + 1)k+1; k 2 0 : n
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l (n   1)!
nl 1(n   l)!
n; 1  l  n (3.27)


























































































































; n  1
Now, the closed-form expressions for the remaining n probabilities, 0;:::;n 1 follow
from (3.27). At last, plugging k, k 2 0 : n, into (3.26) and using the obtained sequence
of ^ T(s : #s = k), k 2 0 : n, in (3.22), leads to the following expression for the
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; n  1
Given (n), it is now straightforward to show that (n) is strictly increasing in n for
any n  1. Reducing (n) and (n+1) to a common denominator and subtracting (n)
from (n + 1), we obtain a ratio where denominator is unambiguously positive and the
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Hence, (n + 1)   (n) > 0 for any n  1. In particular, as the size of the network, n,
becomes arbitrarily large, the steady-state probability of employment approaches 1. 
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